Thanasis Photiou
The UN Secretary-General's personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, appears to have succeeded in bringing the two leaders together for another trilateral meeting, with hopes of announcements that will allow the process to continue. Given the difficulties and lack of progress in recent months, the Cyprus problem once again seems to be gaining momentum. The question is where that momentum is taking us.
Hakan Fidan's arrival in the occupied territories appears to have set the limits for the next steps by the Turkish Cypriot leadership: agreement on crossing points, insistence on a two-state solution, and the possibility that an international conference may not take place. In other words, a perfectly consistent strategy: offering just enough movement to avoid being blamed for the deadlock, while making no concessions on the issues that define its substance. Put simply, the question I raised above can probably be answered as follows: let the process move forward, even if the Cyprus problem itself is not getting any closer to a solution.
No, I am not underestimating the importance of a possible agreement on new crossing points. Nor should the United Nations' efforts to keep channels of communication open be dismissed. But recognising the value of these steps is one thing. Engaging in unrealistic and excessive optimism that, 50 years on, opening one or more crossing points and removing mines from the buffer zone somehow amount to a genuine effort to resolve the Cyprus problem is quite another. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The truly interesting part of this story begins here, because Turkey's position is not being shaped in a diplomatic vacuum. It is taking shape at a time when the European Union is reassessing its priorities, with defence and security now at the top of the agenda. Uncertainty over the future of the United States' role in Europe's security architecture, coupled with the need to strengthen Europe's defence industry, is making Turkey an increasingly valuable geopolitical partner. Pavlos Xanthoulis's revealing report in today's edition of Kathimerini (page 4) adds an important dimension to the picture. According to an internal document from Cyprus's Foreign Ministry, Nicosia fears that closer EU-Turkey cooperation will bring growing pressure for a more pragmatic European approach towards Ankara. This is not just a theoretical concern. Germany, Italy and other influential European countries are developing defence partnerships with Turkey, while discussions are underway about European security arrangements that could also give Ankara a role.
The real question, then, is not simply what Turkey wants from the Cyprus problem, but what it can gain without having to resolve it. If its opportunities for cooperation with Europe are expanding, why should it feel compelled to make meaningful concessions? And if a limited show of flexibility helps it project the image of a constructive negotiating partner, why wouldn't it take advantage of that? We do not know whether this is the thinking behind Turkey's latest moves. It is, however, a reasonable strategic interpretation, particularly given that the Foreign Ministry itself is warning about the risk of Europe becoming increasingly dependent on Turkey for its strategic needs.
This brings us to a second issue, one that is just as important: our own government's policy. Nikos Christodoulides has made the revival of the Cyprus problem and its connection to EU-Turkey relations central to his strategy. These are legitimate goals and, in principle, the right ones. The problem begins when objectives are presented almost as achievements, and the mere existence of a process is treated as proof that the strategy is working. Last May, the President was talking about developments that could even lead to a settlement plan before the end of 2026. Today, the most significant development on the table is a possible agreement on four crossing points, while Turkey continues to officially insist on a two-state solution. Even more troubling is the contradiction between the government's assurances that it has blocked Turkey's participation in European defence planning and the concerns documented by the Foreign Ministry itself. The gap between what the government says publicly and what its own officials are assessing internally is not a minor issue of public relations. It is a question of strategic preparedness.
Of course, Cyprus has institutional rights as a member state of the European Union. But Europe does not operate solely through decisions that can be vetoed. It also operates through bilateral agreements, partnerships and new mechanisms in which not every member state can be expected to have the same influence. International law and United Nations resolutions are essential foundations of our policy. But they are not, in themselves, a complete strategy.
There is one final point worth considering. We have grown accustomed to presenting ourselves as the side calling for negotiations, with Turkey cast as the party standing in their way. But what happens if Ankara eventually decides to make a tactical concession, not enough to bring about a solution, but just enough to shift international pressure onto Nicosia? Will we be ready to make the "difficult decisions" the President has promised?
The worst thing that could happen to us is not ending up at yet another deadlock. It is getting there after convincing ourselves that we were making progress. It is wasting precious political time while Turkey strengthens its international standing and Europe reshuffles its priorities. And once again, we will find ourselves asking who is responsible for the fact that all this diplomatic activity led us nowhere, except to the next deadlock.
Unless, of course, four more crossing points make the journey towards the Schengen zone a little easier. In that case, who really has the appetite to deal with the Cyprus problem in any meaningful way?
