Apostolos Tomaras
Avoiding a direct clash with the Presidential Palace over his departure from the cabinet, Giorgos Papanastasiou diplomatically conveys his frustration with the President's political choices. Speaking to Kathimerini Cyprus, the former Energy Minister notes that he expected far more political backing on energy matters, suggesting that his efforts to cap the sale price of renewable energy ruffled a few feathers.
Mr. Papanastasiou takes a similar line when discussing his rift with Makis Keravnos over the subsea electricity cable, openly questioning the decision by Christodoulides and Mitsotakis to order yet another viability study. The former minister is equally blunt about the current power outages, holding both the EAC and CERA responsible.
How does it feel to be the Energy Minister of a country that can't reliably power its own population?
CERA is responsible for forecasting energy demand, and based on hard data, they should have blown the whistle early on as the state's official advisor, not waited until the absolute last minute.
Well, I am no longer the sitting Energy Minister. But any proper Energy Minister feels awful and finds themselves in a tough spot during a power crunch. Electricity isn't a luxury; it's a basic necessity for daily life. In a situation like this, a minister's job is to use solid planning and strategy to ensure we have enough generation capacity to cover even the worst-case scenarios, like simultaneous plant breakdowns during extreme heatwaves or cold snaps.
It is the duty of the state and whichever government is in power, through the Energy Ministry, to keep everything running smoothly so that citizens get a reliable power supply at a price they can actually afford.
Power shortages have been an ongoing issue in Cyprus for years. How would you rank who is to blame?
Beyond basic equipment failures, there are clear root causes for these blackouts. First off, the actual real-world output of the EAC's conventional power plants is lower than their theoretical installed capacity. So while we have a massive surplus of renewable energy during the day, mostly from solar, the moment solar production drops off in the late afternoon and evening, the entire grid relies on conventional plants.
Now, a government that actually plans ahead and executes its strategy makes sure its conventional generation is flexible and strong enough to handle extreme demand spikes. Ours isn't, simply because we haven't invested enough or acted fast enough to upgrade conventional plants. We've been left with outdated, inefficient, and rigid power stations, especially at the EAC's Dhekelia site. Meanwhile, the investments at Vasilikos were designed to run on natural gas, but since we don't have natural gas yet, those units sit idle. On top of that, we lack energy storage systems for renewables that could feed the grid during peak evening hours.
Finally, the grid in Cyprus is small and completely isolated, with zero interconnections to neighboring systems that could bridge supply gaps. To put it simply: the core problem is that Cyprus operates a tiny, isolated power grid with virtually no backup margin.
You brought up the conventional power stations owned by the EAC. Is the EAC to blame for these power failures?
I wouldn't place all the blame on the EAC, even though they certainly share responsibility for how slowly they build out infrastructure, which is largely tied to the bureaucracy of a state-owned enterprise. On the flip side, the state itself has repeatedly failed to bring natural gas to the island. So responsibility lies with both the state and the EAC.
When the state gave the green light for new, flexible power units, I personally pointed out this urgent need to the EAC back in April 2023. Yet the orders for those units were only placed a few weeks ago, meaning the first one won't even be operational until 2028! Think about that. If it takes five years to get a single unit up and running, that points to a severe failure to execute the country's strategic energy plan on time.
Equal blame belongs to those who failed to require energy storage systems at solar and wind farms. From day one, permits for commercial solar and wind farms should have been tied directly to mandatory storage infrastructure.
During your time as Energy Minister, did you attempt to hold the EAC accountable?
I made continuous efforts and stepped in with every entity tied to these power shortages. We can't forget that regulatory bodies like the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority make the rules and govern the electricity market. You also have two system operators: the Transmission System Operator and the Distribution System Operator.
I repeatedly warned the EAC, our sole public producer of conventional power, that its slow pace of work was completely out of step with the country's projected electricity needs. At the same time, CERA carries the mandate to forecast demand. As the state's advisor, they should have presented clear data and sounded the alarm well in advance, rather than waiting until we hit a crisis point.
While you were in office, did any of these regulatory bodies warn you that a major supply crisis was coming?
We received generic warnings, but never a formal, data-backed proposal. Time and again, we had to push for independent, specialized firms to conduct realistic impact studies.
Did you face any pressure or political pushback to avoid calling out those responsible for these power failures, like the conventional power producers?
No, nobody approached me directly with that kind of pressure. That didn't happen. But I did notice a widespread sense of complacency, along with a total lack of coordination among key players when it came to securing our power supply.
In the public eye, the EAC takes the brunt of the blame because rolling blackouts happen when the grid depends 100% on conventional power. People forget about the renewable energy producers who weren't required, or simply refused, to install battery storage when they got their site permits. Storage was originally part of the licensing terms, but it was stripped out after developers argued it was too expensive and would scare away investors. We let renewable generation expand wildly without building out storage alongside it. We dropped the ball on that, big time.
On the political side, when you stepped down from the government, did you feel like you were being pushed out as the black sheep?
No, I never felt that way. But I do think the steps we took at the ministry got a bit too close to comfort for some. My sole goal was ensuring a reliable, affordable power supply for everyday consumers, regardless of the political cost. Taking that stance naturally ruffled feathers and left me politically exposed.
What do you mean when you say those steps got a bit too close to comfort?
It comes down to how renewable energy producers get paid, combined with the delayed rollout of a competitive electricity market after a seven-year "transitional period" that suited a lot of established players just fine.
Under the EU's Target Model, renewable producers are compensated based on the production costs of the most expensive generation technology on the grid, which in Cyprus happens to be the EAC's conventional plants. That needs to change. We need regulations ensuring green energy is sold based on what it actually costs to produce, not tied to the price of oil-fired power. You could achieve this through voluntary producer pricing, margin caps on renewable profits, or a windfall tax that gets returned directly to consumers as a rebate. At the ministry, our priority was protecting the consumer's wallet, which was a core pledge in President Christodoulides's own campaign platform. But along the way, that work clearly made certain groups uncomfortable.
Limited Support
Did you receive the political backing you needed to carry out your agenda?
Personally, I felt the support was limited. Given that our initiatives directly impacted consumers and were part of the government's official platform, I expected more backing. In hindsight, I recognize that in politics, which isn't my background, there is always a push to balance competing corporate and political interests.
Are you referring to the Finance Minister?
I'm not going to call out specific names. As long as renewable curtailments remained low, green energy developers were making massive profits. When you push for a cost-reflective pricing system, you directly hit those profit margins, which were extraordinarily high for a while.
On top of that, when internal government debates started stalling a key project designed to secure our energy supply and lower consumer costs, specifically the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) cable, the Energy Minister's position had to be crystal clear. Without that subsea cable, the state cannot fulfill its overall energy roadmap or meet the supply security targets agreed upon with the EU.
Naturally, it was hard to convince financial officials who evaluate everything purely through a balance sheet. That's why we ended up in endless debates over the project's economic viability. My position was always focused on long-term energy security and grid reliability, because once you lose those, the financial damage is far worse. That isn't always easy for a finance official to see ahead of time. A subsea electricity connector is a matter of national security, much like buying defense systems where you don't stall procurement over whether the investment yields a direct financial return.
How do you view ENI's final investment decision on the "Cronos" gas field, which was finalized after you left office?
Reaching a final investment decision on Cronos took years of hard work by many dedicated people. I am thrilled the decision went through, and it doesn't matter in the slightest whose tenure it happened under. During my time at the ministry, I always prioritized the country's long-term interests. We got the ball rolling and finalized agreements that had been stalled for years.
Even if the project isn't the single most lucrative deal on paper for the Republic of Cyprus, it carries immense strategic value within our regional geopolitics. I sincerely hope that the "Aphrodite" field, another mature site we fought hard for, follows suit and reaches a final investment decision soon.
Another study for the electricity cable is unnecessary
Are you bitter that the President sided with the Finance Ministry's stance on the GSI cable over yours?
The President has publicly stated multiple times that he supports the subsea cable, which is an official EU project. But beyond public statements, we need tangible, concrete actions from everyone involved to actually build it. The project has real engineering and geopolitical hurdles, and we should be actively managing those challenges instead of constantly kicking the project back to financial committees for reviews that could ultimately kill it.
Do you believe the interconnector will ever actually be built?
Based on current statements from decision-makers, they are waiting on an updated viability study. In my humble opinion, and for the reasons I mentioned earlier, that study is completely unnecessary. Every single time you order a new study, the project gets delayed and the price tag goes up. We started at €1.54 billion, watched it climb to €1.9 billion, and with every new delay, the final cost will only keep rising.
