By Giorgos Kentas
Israel’s parliamentary election on Oct. 27 comes amid profound domestic changes and significant shifts in the regional security landscape. The result will influence governance at home, the handling of the Palestinian issue, and Israel’s relations with its regional and international partners. Yet the most important consideration is not necessarily who becomes the next prime minister, but how much continuity there will be in Israel’s strategy as challenges mount and the balance of power shifts.
The election backdrop
Israeli society heads to the polls, having endured the traumatic consequences of Hamas’ terrorist attack on Oct. 7, 2023, the painful hostage ordeal, and a prolonged period of military operations. Security remains the overriding social and political priority. At the same time, Israelis face the economic consequences of the conflicts, the burden on military reservists, disputes over military service for the ultra-Orthodox and the need to restore trust in state institutions. Foreign policy and domestic governance have become more closely intertwined than at any other time in recent years.
The election centers on Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival and the prospect of an alternative governing majority. Gadi Eisenkot has emerged as a significant contender for prime minister, emphasizing his national security experience and the need for renewed leadership. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, working with Yair Lapid, is also seeking a decisive role, while smaller parties could influence the formation of a government. Polls show a fluid contest, with no coalition assured of an outright majority. After all, voters do not directly elect the prime minister. The choice emerges through the process of forming a government that must secure the confidence of the Knesset.
Where political rivals agree—and where they differ
Despite substantial political differences, the main parties share the view that Israel’s security requires a strong deterrent, a response to the Iranian threat and the prevention of Hamas’ reestablishment as a military force in Gaza. Their differences concern primarily the conduct of military operations, Gaza’s postwar governance and the prospects for diplomatic arrangements. The next government will have to combine the protection of Israeli citizens with the need to stabilize humanitarian conditions, ease regional tensions and establish a viable political future for the Palestinians.
The special relationship with the United States remains crucial. American military, diplomatic and technological support is a fundamental source of Israeli strength. At the same time, Israel is seeking greater independence in its defense industry by expanding domestic production and gradually reducing critical dependencies. Pro-Israel organizations in the United States continue to play an important role in shaping public debate and political priorities, without eliminating the differences emerging within American society.
Meanwhile, Israeli citizens’ growing sense of insecurity abroad, amid antisemitic incidents and intense political polarization, is encouraging the search for safe destinations and new economic and social opportunities.
A lasting outlook for Cyprus-Israel cooperation
Against this backdrop, Cyprus takes on particular importance. This year marks 16 years since the 2010 agreement delimiting the two countries’ exclusive economic zones. The relationship’s development was neither predetermined nor assured. For decades, strong strategic cooperation between Israel and Turkey limited the prospects for a meaningful rapprochement with Nicosia. The deterioration in Israeli-Turkish relations created new opportunities, which the Republic of Cyprus seized with political readiness and strategic foresight.
In its early stages, cooperation was marked by unequal capabilities and contributions. Gradually, however, Cyprus strengthened its value as a reliable partner, a European state, a hub for humanitarian operations and a source of regional stability. Cooperation in energy, defense, intelligence, technology and the protection of critical infrastructure now gives the bilateral relationship substantial strategic depth.
Another dimension is the growing Israeli presence in Cyprus. Property purchases, business activity and families settling on the island are gradually creating a dynamic community with an economic and social footprint. This development fits within Cyprus’ long tradition as a safe and welcoming home for foreign communities, including the British, Russians, Ukrainians and Lebanese. The Israeli presence creates additional ties between the two societies, but also requires careful management of issues surrounding social cohesion and economic development.
An emerging security framework in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East
The most significant development, however, is the emergence of a new security framework in the Eastern Mediterranean. Trilateral cooperation between Cyprus, Greece and Israel now provides a solid and dynamic foundation for regional cooperation, extending to energy security, the protection of sea routes, deterrence and economic prosperity. U.S. participation through the 3+1 framework broadens its strategic significance, while Cyprus’ strengthened relations with Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states create a wider network of shared interests.
The Cyprus-Israel relationship is not a military alliance. It is an enhanced strategic partnership founded on converging interests, shared security perspectives and mutual reliability. That distinction matters. Cyprus must avoid becoming part of the confrontation between Israel and Turkey or restricting the independence of its foreign policy. It must, however, use the changing circumstances to strengthen its international standing and its ability to protect its sovereign rights.
This shift inevitably affects the Cyprus issue, as it reshapes the regional environment in which the Republic’s security, sovereignty and strategic importance are defined. It does not replace the need for a political settlement or remove existing threats. It does, however, create additional scope for diplomatic and strategic action.
Regardless of Israel’s election result, the prospects for continuing and deepening cooperation remain positive. Israel’s foreign policy, defense and security institutions ensure a significant degree of strategic continuity. The real question for Cyprus is how it will make use of a historic shift in the Eastern Mediterranean’s security landscape, whoever governs Israel.
The security of Cyprus and Israel is becoming increasingly interconnected. That development brings opportunities and responsibilities requiring confidence, strategic consistency and long-term planning.
*Giorgos Kentas is an associate professor of international politics and governance at the University of Nicosia.
