Athanasios Ellis
The secretary-general of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, visited Cyprus this week, with the aim of securing a minimum of consensus for a meeting between the different sides before his term expires at the end of the year. It seems that he succeeded.
There are emotional considerations. They are, obviously, significant for the Greek Cypriots, having endured the painful reality of a nation invaded and a significant portion remaining under occupation for 52 years. One detects similar feelings on the Turkish Cypriot side, too, many of whose members feel more Cypriot than Turkish. But apart from the emotions, each side has its own strategic objectives.
This is true not only for the protagonists—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, as well as the “motherlands” Greece and Turkey—but also for the European Union, which is part of the equation by the very nature of the situation.
In this context it is somewhat curious that the EU appears willing to support a solution which, in one form or another – at least among those currently being discussed – will allow Turkey to intervene in the Union’s internal processes and decision-making. The extent to which this would be true obviously remains to be seen, but influence there will certainly be.
Athens and Nicosia want to see the island reunified under a solution that will be based not only on UN resolutions and the principles of international law, but also on the dictates of rationality.
At the same time, it goes without saying that in a unified Republic of Cyprus, the rights of a significant portion of the Cypriot people—the Turkish Cypriot community—must enjoy institutionalized protection with robust safeguards.
However, it is hard to fathom why the EU would accept a so-called political equality, which, to the lopsided and distorted degree being proposed, will not only hamper the functioning of Cyprus itself but will also give Ankara a disproportionately strong voice in Brussels.
This is something that neither the Greeks nor the Greek Cypriots want, nor other important countries in the Eastern Mediterranean which are increasingly – and justly – concerned by Turkey’s transformation into a country that feels unjustly contained within its current borders and constantly demonstrates its desire for a much bigger regional role that also includes a physical military presence in other countries, from Syria to Libya.
Given Ankara’s overall attitude of late, would this truly be in the best interest of the EU?
I will not get into the specifics of a solution—security, guarantees, withdrawal of foreign forces, single sovereignty, citizenship and the matter of international personality, or an implementation monitoring mechanism—we are not there yet. I am simply pointing out that everyone agrees the key to the solution lies not within the two communities, but in Ankara. And that in itself speaks volumes.
