Yiannis Ioannou
When Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told a journalist from the Greek newspaper Ta Nea in Brussels last week that Turkey “agrees” to the Cyprus-Greece electricity interconnection, provided it receives advance information from Greece, diplomatic alarm bells rang in Athens. The Greek Foreign Ministry responded firmly to the seasoned Turkish diplomat’s ambiguity.
While most Greek media coverage focused on whether notification meant a NAVTEX maritime advisory, a formal diplomatic note or an unofficial press release, the broader implications of Fidan’s statement appear to extend across the Eastern Mediterranean, with the Republic of Cyprus also clearly in his sights.
This comes at a time when the Cyprus issue remains on hold, the 2019 Turkey-Libya “memorandum” is resurfacing following a change of approach by the Libyan side led by Khalifa Haftar, and Greek diplomats see the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) as carrying implications ranging from preserving “calm waters” with Turkey to a return to the tensions of 2020 or the incident off Kasos.
Behind Fidan’s statement
Fidan’s remarks to Ta Nea went beyond notification about the activities of the French survey vessel associated with the GSI. They also included comments playing down the “Blue Homeland” doctrine and explanations of the 'casus belli'—grounds for war—as Turkey has interpreted it since 1995.
Fidan, considered one of the leading contenders to succeed Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the coming years, initially framed his message as: “We have no problem with the cable, and we told the Greek side we could supply you with energy.”
Yet his demand for notification also introduces another small precedent into Greek-Turkish relations. Not a legal precedent in the strict sense of international law, but one based on the principle of “tell us before you act.”
Experienced observers of Eastern Mediterranean developments told Kathimerini that Turkey is adding another cherry to its basket through its familiar practice of “cherry-picking.” It is sending a strong signal to countries in the region that any energy development concerns Turkey and must go through it.
Ankara has been conveying that message since 2011, culminating in its illegal drilling activities in waters off Cyprus in 2019-2020.
The implications for Cyprus
The GSI issue clearly concerns Cyprus as well as Greek-Turkish relations.
The project has already entered public debate as a potential source of disagreement between Greece and Cyprus, with Athens and Nicosia assessing the costs and benefits of the electricity connection differently.
Fidan’s statement also seeks to exploit that relationship through the demand for notification, highlighting potential cracks between Athens and Nicosia through the narrative that “Athens is risking a confrontation with Turkey for the sake of a Cyprus that does not want the cable.”
The timing also matters. The Cyprus issue is entering a difficult period, with Ankara already assigning blame over what it portrays as the Greek Cypriot side’s lack of sincere commitment to moving negotiations forward.
Against that background, Fidan’s conciliatory energy message—"we want the cable, but keep us informed"—creates another avenue for diplomatic pressure: “Ankara is pursuing a policy of zero problems, but the obstacle remains the Republic of Cyprus, which will not agree to a settlement.”
Meanwhile, well-informed sources told Kathimerini that Athens will respond on the Turkey-Libya “memorandum” front by reengaging with Egypt to continue maritime boundary discussions in the area, following the Greek-Egyptian agreement referred to in the report as dating from 2019.
And the Cyprus issue
Fidan may be playing the card of diplomatic ambiguity over energy in the Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical arena. On the Cyprus issue, however, there appears to be little prospect—at least before the end of the year—of a breakthrough toward ending the negotiating deadlock.
Ahead of another meeting between the two leaders, Nicosia has taken note of a shift in Tufan Erhürman’s approach toward publicly undercutting President Nikos Christodoulides.
Well-informed sources told Kathimerini that Turkey wants to retain control over the pace of developments. Its aim, should a small opportunity emerge to break the deadlock, is to agree to an informal five-party meeting and thereby present a constructive face to outside parties, particularly the European Union.
Expectations for talks before the end of the year nevertheless remain extremely low.
Finally, if the Cyprus issue reaches a definitive impasse over the next six months, Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem could begin to follow separate paths, despite the view that progress on either helps the other.
The Cyprus issue could enter a period of uncertainty without necessarily preventing Greek-Turkish relations from continuing through a period of “calm waters.”
