Yiannis Ioannou
When Israeli President Isaac Herzog gave Gadi Eisenkot the mandate to form a government last Sunday, the news barely registered in Cyprus. Eisenkot, best known here for the giant campaign banner on the highway, was now within reach of putting together a government that could formally end Benjamin Netanyahu’s tenure as prime minister.
Israel’s election in late October received some coverage in Cyprus. As usual, though, what came next drew far less attention: no party could govern on its own, the process of forming a government could stretch into early December, and Israel could yet face another series of elections, as it did when it went to the polls five times between 2019 and 2022. In Cyprus, Israel tends to make the news when security is at stake. Its domestic politics rarely get the same scrutiny.
Even if Gadi Eisenkot becomes Israel’s prime minister in early December, there is little reason to expect an immediate weakening of the partnership between Cyprus and Israel.
Yet a post-Netanyahu Israel now looks like a real possibility. The implications extend from regional diplomacy and the balance of power to Cyprus’ relationship with Israel and, of course, the conflicts set in motion by Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel.
“Bibi” and Cyprus
There is little doubt that Netanyahu left his mark on relations between Cyprus and Israel. The two countries had already begun drawing closer in 2011. Netanyahu helped shape that relationship during his return to the forefront of Israeli politics in 2015 and again after 2022, when he joined forces with the conservative religious right and the ultranationalist Kahanists.
Under Netanyahu, Cyprus and Israel deepened their defense and security cooperation, laid the groundwork for three-way diplomacy involving Greece and Egypt, and built closer ties in trade and tourism.
Netanyahu also took a harder rhetorical line against Turkey than any Israeli leader in recent years. That began well before the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks, which permanently changed the dynamics of conflict between Israel, the United States and Iran. Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv, historically very close, had already deteriorated after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident.
Netanyahu’s rhetoric sharpened during the Gaza war and turned into a personal confrontation with Erdoğan. By late 2024, it had taken on the character of a Cold War standoff. The fall of Bashar Assad’s government in Syria brought Turkey, whose influence in Damascus had grown, closer to Israel’s border.
Two threads ran through Netanyahu’s approach. He invoked the Cyprus issue to hit back at Turkey’s fierce criticism of the Gaza war, while prolonging that destructive war served his own political survival. Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus became his retort to Erdoğan. Behind the rhetoric lay a genuine Israeli security concern about Turkey’s growing influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. The geography of that rivalry runs through Greece and Cyprus and reaches Israel’s border with Syria at the Golan Heights, occupied since 1967.
Some commentators, especially in the specialist press in Cyprus and Greece, see Turkey’s “Blue Homeland,” the “Wrath of Poseidon” and, before long, an outright war between Israel and Turkey. The reality is less dramatic. Relations between the two countries are strained, and diplomatic ties remain in place.
Cyprus without “Bibi”
Even if Eisenkot becomes prime minister in early December, there is little reason to expect an immediate downgrade in the partnership between Cyprus and Israel, a chill in bilateral relations or a retreat from defense and security cooperation.
Eisenkot’s campaign banner drew criticism from Greek Cypriot activists who objected to Israeli electioneering spilling into public life in Cyprus. Its intended audience was Israelis who live on the island or were visiting, whom the campaign saw as a more progressive part of Israeli society.
Experienced diplomats told Kathimerini that if Eisenkot forms a broad coalition that excludes the Kahanists, they expect him to take a less combative tone toward Turkey than Netanyahu did. They also expect him to repair relations with European capitals. Under Netanyahu, disagreements over Gaza led to diplomatic incidents with France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany.
Those same sources expect Nicosia and Tel Aviv to remain close under Eisenkot. His government would also inherit the issues the two countries have yet to settle, including their differences over the Aphrodite and Yishai gas deposits.
A change of tone at the Israeli Embassy
In Nicosia, Shuli Davidovich has taken up her post as Israel’s ambassador, succeeding Oren Anolik. Her first message on X caught the attention of diplomats. In a polished short video, she struck a positive note about deepening ties between Cyprus and Israel.
Davidovich is regarded as a seasoned diplomat. She played an active role in efforts concerning the hostages taken by Hamas on Oct. 7 and worked for years alongside former Israeli President Reuven Rivlin. In Brussels, she held key posts dealing with Israel’s relations with NATO and the European Union. She also served at Israel’s permanent mission to the United Nations.
Cyprus is the final posting of her diplomatic career.
