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A quiet tug-of-war is playing out in Greece, one that could reshape global trade routes and shift the balance of power in the Mediterranean.
According to Kathimerini's Vasilis Nedos and Elias Belos, the United States wants greater control over Greece’s major ports. That’s not speculation; it’s the clear mission behind a wave of new diplomatic activity in Athens. American officials, under orders from Washington, are setting their sights on the ports of Thessaloniki, Alexandroupolis, and even Piraeus, currently run by China’s state-owned company COSCO.
Why the sudden urgency? It’s all about a new trade route that bypasses China entirely.
The so-called India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) is a bold plan to connect India with Europe via the Middle East, skipping over both China and Turkey. And for this route to work, the U.S. wants Greece, specifically its ports, to be the gateway into Europe. But there’s one major obstacle: China’s firm foothold in Piraeus, Greece’s largest port.
American officials, under orders from Washington, are setting their sights on the ports of Thessaloniki, Alexandroupolis, and even Piraeus, currently run by China’s state-owned company COSCO.
So, the U.S. is reportedly applying pressure on Athens to make life difficult for COSCO, perhaps difficult enough that the Chinese giant considers pulling out. Thessaloniki is also in the spotlight, with the U.S. eyeing a direct stake in the port. Alexandroupolis, once seen mainly as a military stopover for Ukraine-bound supplies, is now being pitched as a key IMEC hub.
This diplomatic campaign isn’t happening in secret. It’s coming in a wave of actions, from Washington’s appointments to quiet moves in Greece’s port authorities.
Donald Trump’s pick for U.S. ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, is expected to land in Athens this summer. A close Trump ally, she’s coming with a clear mission: stop China from expanding its influence in Greece. She’ll be joined by Josh Hack, a senior diplomat with experience in both the Eastern Mediterranean and China.
Back in Greece, the signs of change are already visible. The government has taken a noticeably tougher tone with port operators, including COSCO in Piraeus and the Russian-Greek business group managing Thessaloniki. Officials are now insisting on faster investments and full compliance with local and EU rules, an unusual shift after years of relatively quiet cooperation.
In March, Greece rejected a Chinese request to allow warships to dock in its ports, a clear message to both Beijing and Washington about where Athens may be leaning.
Meanwhile, behind the scenes, business is also stirring. In a surprise move, a Chinese billionaire’s company recently agreed to sell off port assets around the world, including some near the Panama Canal, to a consortium involving American financial giant BlackRock and an Italian shipping family. The timing is no coincidence.
Back in Greece, new legislation is in the works to tighten oversight of any foreign investments in strategic infrastructure, like ports and underwater cables. The message? Foreign money is still welcome, but only if it’s transparent and doesn’t pose national or geopolitical risks.
This isn’t just about business. It’s about who gets to shape the next era of global trade. And right now, Greece is caught in the middle of a geopolitical tug-of-war, one port at a time.