Pavlos Xanthoulis
Turkey is sending the message to Brussels that there is only one role the European Union could play in the Cyprus issue, according to information obtained by “K”: implementing the EU conclusions of April 2004, which stated that “the Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community...”
As we understand it, Ankara has conveyed these messages both to European Commission Executive Vice President Rafael Fitto and to other EU officials. Turkey is presenting the activation of what it calls the “Three As”, direct trade, direct flights and direct relations between the Turkish Cypriot community and the EU as a whole, as an “urgent necessity.”
In the arguments Ankara has put forward to Brussels, it is also attempting to present these demands as “Confidence-Building Measures” (CBMs).
The stated aim is “to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and the discrimination imposed by the Greek Cypriot administration (i.e. the Republic of Cyprus) on the Turkish Cypriot ‘people’,” while bypassing Turkey’s invasion and occupation of Cyprus and the consequences these have had for the Turkish Cypriot community itself.
Ankara is invoking the EU conclusions of April 2004 and demanding that Brussels move toward “ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.”
The same applies to the issue of children from “mixed marriages” between Turkish Cypriots and settlers. Ankara is calling for EU intervention “to put an end to this blatant injustice,” as Turkish officials have described it to Brussels.
The Turkish side expects the EU to intervene with Nicosia so that children from mixed marriages can obtain EU passports through the Republic of Cyprus. Tufan Erhürman is also understood to have conveyed similar messages to Rafael Fitto, asking Brussels “to intervene decisively to end the injustice.”
Whether for tactical or substantive reasons, the Turkish Cypriot leader initially appeared unwilling “to receive” Rafael Fitto. He later changed course following an intervention with Ankara attributed to Antonio Guterres. Erhürman subsequently agreed to meet Fitto, after first coordinating with the Turkish Foreign Ministry on the messages he would seek to convey to the Commission executive vice president.
In any event, and this is also significant, Guterres' announcement of the controversial 5+1 multilateral conference — the two communities, the three guarantor powers and the United Nations — once again leaves the EU out of the picture, for obvious reasons linked to Ankara's objections.
Turkey, after all, “believes that the only service the EU could offer is to honour its promises to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots,” as well as “take the necessary steps to incorporate the solution into the EU acquis,” whatever that solution may be.
Not the other way around, as Nicosia expects. The Cypriot government believes that the EU has a duty and obligation to intervene decisively to ensure that any solution being sought is based on European principles and values and on the EU acquis.
For some, however, that acquis is considered elastic enough to be stretched or shrunk whenever necessary — as people around Günter Verheugen also suggested in 2004.
EU-Turkey relations and the Cyprus issue
The much-desired linkage between EU-Turkey relations and the Cyprus problem continues to require a sufficiently attractive incentive for Ankara. For now, such an incentive is missing from the EU's toolbox, making Nicosia's strategy more difficult.
The current situation does not serve the Cypriot government either in substance or in terms of communication, particularly given that Nicosia has spent more than two years claiming that it has succeeded in linking the Cyprus issue with EU-Turkey relations.
If it had already succeeded, as the President of the Republic has repeatedly argued, there would be nothing left to discuss today. The Cyprus issue would be moving forward alongside the EU-Turkey dossiers. That, however, is not happening.
Indeed, of the seven major EU-Turkey dossiers, at least four have already moved forward without any linkage to the Cyprus problem.
All high-level political dialogues have resumed; Turkey has participated in informal meetings of EU foreign ministers, known as Gymnich meetings; the European Investment Bank has returned and taken on new projects in Turkey; and visa facilitations have been granted to Turkish citizens, with the exception of truck drivers.
All of this has already happened without Turkey having to make any concession whatsoever on the Cyprus issue.
What essentially remains is the upgrading of Turkey's Customs Union — something that could generate substantial benefits both for EU member states and Ankara — but this cannot be implemented through the fast-track procedure demanded by Tayyip Erdogan.
Turkey's request for full EU visa liberalization, rather than the facilitations already granted, faces a similar level of difficulty. Six of the 72 benchmarks on Turkey's roadmap remain outstanding, while several countries, particularly France, are understood to oppose such a development even if Ankara fulfils the necessary requirements.
The only possibility that appears to remain on the horizon is Turkey's participation at the state level in EU defense and security, including the SAFE program.
But beyond moves toward resolving the Cyprus problem, that would also require Turkey to lift its *casus belli* against Greece.
This is something Turkey is not only considered unlikely to do but also appears to be moving in precisely the opposite direction by promoting its “Blue Homeland” doctrine. Ankara is expected to turn the doctrine into national legislation very soon, advancing claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
These developments are also connected to Erdogan's efforts to remain in power until 2033, possibly through early elections.
Erdogan “now and forever”
According to sources at EU headquarters, Tayyip Erdogan wants to remain at the helm of Turkey despite the fact that his current term—his second as president under the present system—does not allow him to seek the presidency again.
There is, however, a window that could allow Erdogan to get around this restriction if early elections are called.
Sources in Brussels told “K” that although elections are scheduled for May 14, 2028, roughly three months after Cyprus' presidential election, Erdogan “could run for a third time” if early elections are called.
That would require the votes of 360 members of Turkey's National Assembly. The governing AKP does not have that number on its own, but, as sources put it, securing the necessary votes “is not impossible.”
Erdogan has, after all, taken steps to reverse the momentum of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), after Turkey's dependent judiciary annulled the party's internal elections, removed its elected leader Özgür Özel and ordered his replacement by 77-year-old Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
There is also a second option reportedly being considered by the Erdogan government: another constitutional amendment.
At present, however, that is considered the more difficult route, although this does not mean it has been abandoned altogether.
