EU pushes a ''European Defense Union'' with a Turkish flavor

The ''major plan'' to establish a European Security Council, announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2026 State of the Union address, has raised serious questions and concerns. An EU official told 'Liberal' that von der Leyen’s proposal appeared “superficial” and was announced without any clear explanation of what the body would do, who would take part, or what its powers would be.

Five days later, on Sept. 14, European Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius took it upon himself to explain the thinking behind the proposal. His remarks served to confirm the concerns already being expressed:

• The European Security Council is intended to become the precursor to a European Defence Union.
• The proposed European Defence Union would involve not only EU member states but also what Brussels calls “key stakeholders,” with Turkey explicitly named among them.
• The first step toward creating such a Defence Union could be through an intergovernmental structure among participating countries, rather than through the EU itself.

One particularly striking aspect of the project, as von der Leyen and Kubilius described it, is that it appears not to have been discussed either with the EU member states or within the European Commission.

This raises a series of questions. Are von der Leyen and Kubilius speaking in a personal capacity? Are they expressing proposals coming from Berlin and Warsaw, their respective capitals? Or have the plans been quietly discussed with EU leaders other than Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, who does not appear to have been aware of them and has repeatedly argued that Turkey cannot participate in Europe’s security arrangements?

Whatever the answer, it is clear that something is moving behind the scenes in Brussels, something that directly affects the vital interests of Cyprus and Greece. Yet the governments of the two countries appear to be in the dark.

What lies behind the proposal

In her 2026 State of the Union address to the European Parliament, von der Leyen proposed creating a European Security Council “to provide high-level political guidance on critical security challenges, involving not only the European Union but the wider Europe.”

She added that, beyond EU member states, “other stakeholders” could participate depending on the issue under discussion.

But which other stakeholders did she mean?

Five days later, in Vilnius on Sept. 14, Kubilius provided the answer: “the United Kingdom, Norway, Ukraine, and perhaps Turkey.” As the official announcement put it, the European Security Council “should include not only traditional stakeholders from EU member states, but also others whose involvement is critical to security: the United Kingdom, Norway, perhaps Turkey, and Ukraine.”

Kubilius said he saw the European Security Council as the precursor to an eventual European Defence Union, which would also include countries outside the EU. These would be the same states referred to as “key stakeholders,” including Turkey.

He went further, explaining how he believed the European Security Council could be formed. It could begin, he said, as an intergovernmental body among interested countries and later acquire a formal legal framework. He estimated that about 12 countries could participate.

He compared the proposal with the United Nations Security Council, which has five permanent members—the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia—along with 10 rotating members.

Intergovernmental—without a veto?

Kubilius’ reference to an intergovernmental arrangement is highly significant. The EU’s institutions and its existing defense and security framework are all governed by the treaties, as agreed and ratified by the member states.

Creating an intergovernmental structure outside the EU framework would mean operating beyond the treaties and institutions, relying instead on agreements among the participating governments.

That, of course, raises another question: Would such an arrangement be subject to the principle of unanimity, with each participating country retaining a veto? Or would decisions be taken by a majority?

A well-placed EU source told 'Liberal' that the use of the phrase “European Security Council,” modelled on the UN body in which the five permanent members wield veto power, was probably no coincidence.

In any event, any intergovernmental decision concerning security would have to be submitted for approval to the national parliament of each participating state, unless the legislature had delegated such authority to the executive.

That would make parliamentary elections even more important, since they would determine how governments form the European Security Council and what role it ultimately plays.

In NATO’s shadow

From the EU institutions’ perspective, the central concern is for neither the European Security Council nor the European Defence Union to compete with NATO.

Both von der Leyen and Kubilius referred to the principle of complementarity with the alliance. As Kubilius explained, the European Defence Union should complement NATO’s security structures, particularly because of Europe’s current weaknesses in military capability.

Both proposals have one overriding goal: European security should continue to be secured primarily by NATO, with Turkey playing a role, while the EU remains secondary.

This is the exact opposite of the position held by Greece and Cyprus, which want the EU to build its own autonomous security capabilities because both countries face a threat from a NATO member state—Turkey. Ankara continues to occupy 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and challenges Greece’s sovereign rights in the Aegean.

Von der Leyen and Kubilius’ proposals, however, would create a European Security Council and then a European Defence Union in which Turkey could participate.

It is also worth recalling that Commission President von der Leyen was recently accused of bypassing Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty, which provides for a mutual-assistance clause similar to NATO’s Article 5. The complaint came in a letter from Cypriot MEP Loucas Fourlas of the European People’s Party, who called for Cyprus to receive support after Iranian drones struck within the territory of the British bases at Akrotiri.

Under Article 42(7), the EU cannot act as a single entity. Assistance is provided by the other member states and can take various forms, including military, medical, firefighting, or diplomatic support.

The only time the clause has been activated was by France after the terrorist attacks in Paris. Britain was the only country to support French military operations, while Germany and Belgium provided limited military assistance. The remaining member states confined themselves to verbal declarations of solidarity.

DISY’s weaknesses and Fourlas’ missteps

The uproar surrounding Loucas Fourlas’ statements about invoking Article 42(7) is not merely a personal matter. Nor does it concern only the MEP himself. It also highlights weaknesses within his party, DISY.

The letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which, according to DISY leader Annita Demetriou, was sent without her knowledge, did not come solely from Fourlas. It was also sent by the other Cypriot MEP in the European People’s Party, Michalis Hadjipantela.

The letter was circulated to the media by the EPP’s press office. In other words, beyond Fourlas’ responsibility and failure to coordinate with DISY, Hadjipantela also bears responsibility. Yet Hadjipantela appears to enjoy a degree of political immunity from Pindarou, DISY’s headquarters. The same cannot be said of Fourlas.

DISY’s communication failures are also revealing. The party has a press office, but it does not appear to have an effective communications adviser—or, if it does, that adviser is not keeping pace with events.

Political life is not confined to the mornings. It continues into the afternoons and evenings. When necessary, the opposition leader must respond and make statements outside regular office hours. That is standard practice everywhere.

Yet when the uproar over Fourlas erupted, DISY officials failed to present the party’s position quickly and effectively.

Demetriou eventually chose to make a statement early the next morning, followed several minutes later by the party’s press office. By then, however, the issue had already spiralled out of control, with DISY isolated and under pressure from every direction. The party leader’s personal office had also failed to grasp the significance of the situation.

That does not excuse Fourlas’ actions. He did not seek approval from the party leadership to send the letter bearing his signature, despite his position as one of DISY’s two vice presidents. He also did not inform Demetriou before making a second move, his statement describing the party’s stance as “the greatest betrayal.”

DISY, however, was also at fault. In addition to its poorly managed response, the party should have given Fourlas the opportunity to explain himself. Instead, it appears to have treated him as an adversary, failing to recognize that a problem involving the party’s vice president is also a problem for the party itself.