By Konstantinos Filis*
Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean are moving quickly and are increasingly complex, with the United States sometimes taking the lead and, in other cases, following the recommendations of its partners.
The Cyprus issue, which has recently returned to the spotlight, is undeniably an important part of the wider regional equation. Some analysts even link it directly to European defense and NATO, arguing that as long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, European and regional security issues will remain incomplete, trapped in a grey zone that could ultimately undermine both American and European interests, especially in light of developments in the Middle East.
It is also well known that the US president is attracted to the prospect of being seen as the person who delivers and seals solutions to conflicts and crises. At the same time, in regions where Washington wants to avoid being tied down in lengthy and uncertain peace or stabilization processes, he gives space to trusted partners to try to reduce tensions and disputes.
This “division of labor" allows the United States to avoid direct intervention while also avoiding accusations that it is ignoring developments or leaving room for rival powers to advance their own interests.
However, there are two fundamental differences compared with similar policies followed by previous US administrations.
The first is that President Donald Trump views American interests through a narrower lens, often connecting them to his own personal perceptions and benefits. This gives his foreign policy a more unconventional and short-term character, particularly regarding the obligations that come with America’s global role and the identification of strategic competitors.
For example, in Syria, Trump may not necessarily view the continued presence of Russian naval forces as a significant threat if it contributes to the stabilization of the country under Ahmed al-Sharaa. Turkey, in this case, may seek to maintain Russia’s presence in Syria in order to negotiate with Moscow, including over issues such as facilitating Ankara’s handling of its S-400 missile system, while also limiting Israel’s room for maneuver by involving as many powers and interests as possible in Syria.
The second difference is that the current US administration places less emphasis on issues of credibility and trust, favoring a more transactional approach in its dealings and negotiations with the rest of the world.
Just as Washington is less concerned about building long-term trust with allies or being viewed as predictable, Trump does not base his relationships with other leaders primarily on reliability and shared values, but rather on effectiveness.
He is not necessarily more comfortable negotiating with leaders who share common values and long-standing interests because he does not place the same importance on those relationships and does not want to be constrained by organizations such as NATO or traditional alliances.
Instead, he prefers working with those who can deliver results. The conditions of these arrangements are often shaped by those partners themselves, who take advantage of what many see as a strategic gap in US policy on several global and regional issues.
As a result, much of the information reaching Washington is not always first-hand but is filtered through countries whose intelligence services have stronger access.
In Syria, Trump, even against Israel’s preferences, has accommodated Erdoğan by significantly reducing the role of the Kurds in Syria’s emerging state structures, while strongly supporting the country’s leadership. In both Syria and Libya, Ankara can present itself to Washington as a provider of solutions, creating opportunities for American companies to participate in reconstruction efforts, investment projects, and the exploitation of natural resources.
A legitimate concern for the Greek side is how Turkey’s leadership will capitalize on the influence it appears to currently enjoy in the White House through its regional role.
These issues are of major importance for Greece and Cyprus, even if they may be viewed as less critical by Washington.
The United States clearly does not want a return to tensions between two NATO allies. Greece remains a crucial link in America’s security and influence network in the wider region, participates in energy projects that strengthen the US presence, and has developed strong ties with Israel. Cyprus, meanwhile, has also increased its importance in American strategic planning.
One argument from the Greek side is that tensions with Turkey could escalate if Ankara attempts to pursue maritime zone agreements with Syria or Egypt. There is already a provision in the Greek-Egyptian agreement requiring Cairo to consult with Athens on relevant issues.
However, it is far from certain whether Trump would immediately recognize the seriousness of such a situation, how he would choose to intervene, or whether he could be persuaded by Erdoğan’s arguments. This is especially true given Trump’s apparent preference for regional arrangements that do not require direct US involvement but instead open the way for business agreements that are of interest to the United States — or even to him personally.
The Cyprus issue and Trump’s potential role
A possible solution to the Cyprus problem after more than 52 years would provide significant diplomatic gains. It would be presented as a historic achievement, help heal a major wound in Greek-Turkish relations, open the way for Cyprus to join NATO, and accelerate the exploitation of natural resources.
This is the picture that will likely be presented to Trump in an effort to encourage his involvement.
However, his Turkish counterpart has the advantage of being a regular interlocutor with the US president and will undoubtedly present his own perspective to a leader who has shown that he places less emphasis on the details and long-term durability of potential agreements.
*Konstantinos Filis is director of the Institute of International Affairs (IGA) and professor at the American College of Greece.
