Thanasis Photiou
Intense diplomatic activity behind the scenes shows UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres pushing hard for the resumption of talks before the end of his term in late 2026, even promoting a specific formula aimed at breaking the long-standing deadlock.
Efforts are now focused on convening an informal enlarged conference towards the end of July, a step widely seen as almost certain, given that the United Nations itself has already signaled its intention. The coming days are considered particularly important, as UN envoy Maria Angela Holguín is completing a series of back-to-back contacts in New York, Brussels, Athens, Ankara and Nicosia.
The political timing
The narrative that Guterres is simply acting under time pressure as his mandate nears its end is, according to diplomatic sources, only part of the picture. The real momentum stems from wider geopolitical calculations and energy projects, as well as ongoing EU–Turkey discussions on relations, accession chapters, and broader cooperation frameworks.
These discussions have long shifted away from an accession process, effectively frozen since 2018, into a more transactional bargaining framework involving trade, migration, energy and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In this landscape, tensions remain high, and the situation is far from straightforward.
To bridge the gap between the Turkish Cypriot side’s position on “two states” and the Greek Cypriot side’s insistence on a bizonal bicommunal federation, the UN is reportedly exploring a form of decentralized federation with strong powers for the two constituent states.
As President Nikos Christodoulides recently noted in an interview, this renewed effort has intensified since March, following Guterres’ visit to Turkey and his discussions with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish foreign minister.
“We are trying to align the Cyprus issue with EU–Turkey relations,” he said.
Washington’s framing and regional dynamics
The broader geopolitical framing of the Cyprus issue has also been echoed in comments by US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who recently described Cyprus as a “boil in the middle of an otherwise healthy body”, remarks that triggered reactions in the region.
Despite the controversy, Barrack stressed that Cyprus is a necessary component of stability and energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean. He argued that lasting stability in the wider Middle East cannot be achieved without integrating Cyprus into a broader regional normalization process.
He also outlined a US vision of acting as a bridge between Greece and Turkey in a new regional architecture focused on energy corridors, referring to a concept stretching “from the Caspian to the Mediterranean.”
Ankara’s unchanged official line
On the surface, Turkey’s official position remains unchanged. Public rhetoric continues to reject a federal solution and promotes instead a two-state model on the island.
President Erdoğan and Turkish officials repeatedly argue that federation is “dead” and insist that the only realistic solution is the recognition of two sovereign states. They also maintain that any return to formal talks must first include recognition of what they call the “sovereign equality” of the Turkish Cypriot entity.
However, behind closed doors, analysts detect a more pragmatic approach that allows the process to continue.
One key indicator, diplomatic sources note, is that Erdoğan has not blocked the convening of the informal 5+1 conference, something that would have been expected had Turkey been fully opposed.
According to high-level diplomatic sources, Erdoğan has also privately acknowledged to foreign leaders that the unresolved Cyprus issue is increasingly costly for Turkey internationally, particularly in its relations with the United States and its broader European ambitions.
Conference prospects and uncertainty
International analysis remains split between cautious optimism over the upcoming informal conference and deep skepticism about its outcome.
If neither side shifts from its entrenched positions—federation for Nicosia or two states for Ankara—the meeting risks becoming yet another record of diplomatic deadlock.
Still, diplomatic sources say the 5+1 format is now effectively “locked in.” UN envoy Maria Angela Holguín herself confirmed in early June, leaving the Presidential Palace, that the meeting will take place.
“Yes, it will take place,” she said, while adding that it was too early to predict results. “We will see what happens in that meeting. If something comes out of it, it would be very good news, but I prefer to wait.”
The goal of the conference, however, is not expected to be a final settlement by the end of the year, as previously speculated, but rather a framework agreement — a strategic understanding that could reopen formal negotiations from where they stopped in Crans-Montana.
Between convergences and red lines
Previous reporting by Pavlos Xanthoulis, combined with recent developments, reinforces two key points: Turkey remains firmly opposed not only to federation but even to references to Crans-Montana, while President Christodoulides has reportedly referred to a form of “constructive ambiguity” regarding the invitation text.
In his recent interview with Kathimerini, Christodoulides avoided explicit reference to an agreed basis of solution or Crans-Montana, instead emphasizing the importance of past convergences as the framework for the new process.
Diplomatic sources say that given Turkey’s insistence on “two states” and “sovereign equality,” the concept of convergences serves as a middle ground designed by the UN to bring both sides to the table without forcing either to appear to retreat from their red lines before negotiations even begin.
“In essence, convergences still point towards a federal solution,” one source noted.
The search for a decentralised federation
On substance, the UN is reportedly exploring a decentralized federation model with strong powers for the two constituent states. The aim is to bridge the gap between the Greek Cypriot insistence on a bizonal bicommunal federation and Turkey’s demand for sovereign equality, while preserving a single international legal personality for the state.
Analysts believe this is precisely why Ankara continues to insist on the two-state model at the rhetorical level, using it as leverage to extract concessions later in the process.
Once negotiations begin, Turkey could present a decentralized federation as a major compromise in exchange for political or strategic gains.
The “Holguin plan” controversy
The Turkish newspaper Sözcü recently published claims about an alleged UN-backed plan attributed to Maria Angela Holguín.
The report suggests the return of Varosha and Morphou to Greek Cypriot administration in exchange for lifting the international isolation of Turkish Cypriots and integrating them into the European Union.
The publication triggered strong reactions in Ankara, with Turkish media describing the alleged plan as a “trap” and a threat to Turkey’s interests.
According to the report, Holguín’s non-paper allegedly outlines a roadmap requiring Turkey to hand over the fenced-off area of Varosha and the Morphou region in return for three major concessions often referred to in diplomacy as the “3 Directs”: direct flights to Ercan airport, direct trade through Famagusta and Kyrenia ports, and direct international contacts in political, sporting and cultural fields.
The nationalist Turkish press framed the plan as an attempt to “buy” Turkish Cypriot sovereignty with economic incentives, accusing the UN of pushing Ankara back towards a federal framework it considers outdated.
Independent Turkish media outlets operating outside Turkey have reportedly confirmed elements of the proposal, also mentioning potential joint management of natural gas and energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean as an additional incentive.
Turkish government sources dismissed the reports as “provocation” and “baseless scenarios” aimed at influencing Ankara ahead of the informal conference.
A “controlled leak”?
International diplomatic sources and foreign correspondents in the region interpret the leak more cautiously.
Rather than pure fabrication, they suggest it may represent a “controlled leak"—either from UN circles testing reactions or from Turkish actors warning against any potential concessions.
Some link the timing to the European Parliament’s latest report on Turkey, which Ankara strongly rejected due to its Cyprus-related references.
In this reading, the Sözcü publication may have functioned as a warning shot from nationalist circles, accusing Erdoğan of engaging in secret diplomacy and preparing concessions on Cyprus in order to improve relations with the West.
The “Taiwan model”
International commentary also notes that the “3 Directs” formula closely resembles what is sometimes referred to as the “Taiwan model.”
Since full diplomatic recognition of the Turkish Cypriot entity is widely seen as unrealistic, the strategic focus would shift towards achieving a Taiwan-style arrangement: direct trade, direct flights, and international sporting and cultural participation—without formal state recognition.
In return, territorial adjustments such as Varosha could be used as bargaining chips.
In other words, Turkish Cypriots would operate as an economically active entity in the international system without formal UN state recognition, a model that remains highly controversial but increasingly discussed in diplomatic circles.
