Pavlos Xanthoulis
President Christodoulides has declared himself ''ready'' to engage in negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem. Wherever he goes, he emphasizes his willingness to resume talks "from where we left off in Crans-Montana," and he invites the Turkish side to participate under UN auspices, highlighting their refusal to come to the table. However, this invitation comes from a position of safety, as Ankara has so far insisted on guaranteeing "sovereign equality" for the occupied territories as a precondition for new negotiations.
But what happens if the Turkish side does finally agree to new talks, as it did in 2004? And crucially, what will be the 'basis' for these discussions?
The UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to Cyprus tried to push for "direct trade," which is akin to endorsing the Taiwanization of occupied Cyprus.
The answer to the second question is critical because the 'basis' of the talks will determine whether the Turkish side will engage in meaningful dialogue. If the "basis" has been eroded to accommodate the Turkish demand for "sovereign equality," it wouldn't be surprising to see Ankara and the pseudo-state involved in a new settlement process for Cyprus.
Since Crans-Montana, has there been an erosion of the agreed framework for a bizonal, bicommunal federation, which our President references? Here’s what has transpired:
- The Turkish side submitted a memorandum to the UN Secretary-General proposing a solution based on "sovereign equality."
- The UN Secretary-General accepted the memorandum without rejecting it, giving the Turkish proposal official status.
- Antonio Guterres appeared willing to reconcile the traditional "agreed framework" of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with the Turkish memorandum for a two-state solution.
- The UN ceded part of the buffer zone (Cetin Kaya stadium) to the authorities of the occupied pseudo-state, despite protests from the Republic of Cyprus.
- Guterres' representative in Cyprus discussed a "practical settlement" between UNFICYP and the pseudo-state, implying a separate military status agreement (SOFA) as if it were a sovereign entity.
- The UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to Cyprus tried to push for "direct trade," which is akin to endorsing the Taiwanization of occupied Cyprus.
- Approval of direct trade, a key demand of Ankara and Ersin Tatar, was resurrected, and Maria Angela Holguin Cuellar discussed these Turkish positions with President Christodoulides. In an interview before leaving Cyprus, she suggested that "the Christodoulides government has a very clear picture and knows what could unlock the process."
- Ankara also formally adopted "international recognition of the 'TRNC'" as a "national policy" through a decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
- Additionally, the Council of Europe decided to end monitoring the case of Titina Loizidou, with significant implications for the refugee/property issue.
- Despite President Christodoulides’ efforts, the EU has neither taken a more active role in the Cyprus problem nor appointed a "strong political personality by decision of the European Council," contrary to what Nicosia advertised.
In light of all this, would it not be wise for the Greek Cypriot side to "shake the stern"? The most important issue here is not the repeated calls for talks by President Christodoulides, but the honest presentation of facts, so the public can form an informed opinion on the expected developments. Christodoulides' narrative of readiness for a Cyprus solution may align with the Boy Scout motto "be prepared," but it lacks grounding in reality. As is well known, "Scout duty" also extends to honesty and taking responsibility—elements that are conspicuously absent from the President's actions and statements.
[This opinion piece was translated from its Greek original by Shemaine Kyriakides]
