Opinion
By Michalis Sophocleous
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the internet revolution was just beginning. Every country rushed to connect with data cables, many undersea, linking continents and islands, including Cyprus. One major route passed through the Suez Canal, connecting Asia, Australia, and the Middle East with Europe.
At the time, Cyprus decided it did not want those cables to land on the island, claiming “these things are not sustainable” and “the internet will take 50 years to become profitable.” The real reason was to protect Cyta’s monopoly.
As a result, the cables terminated at the Nile Delta and from there continued to Sicily. That decision condemned us to thirty years of the most expensive and inefficient telecommunications in Europe. We could not become a regional technology hub because we lacked the foundation: the internet itself.
Today, a similar story is unfolding, this time in energy. With the rise of artificial intelligence, global energy demand is expected to quadruple over the next decade.
One AI Data Center in Cyprus could consume 20 to 25 percent of our current electricity. Yet every energy plan faces delays and excuses. What is truly being protected is an oligopoly dominated by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus and a few local producers fearful of foreign competition.
This discussion comes in light of the latest episode in the mishandling of the Great Sea Interconnector by the Cypriot government. I cannot say if the GSI is the right solution for Cyprus to secure its electricity. What I know is that the country needs reliable and sufficient energy for the future. Otherwise, history will repeat itself: thirty more years of Europe’s most expensive electricity, insufficient production, and stunted growth.
Cyprus’ electricity market is currently worth about 1.5 billion euros a year and will grow significantly. Whether a project offering security, uninterrupted supply, and opportunity is worth our roughly 1 billion euro contribution, alongside 650 million from the EU and 350 million from Greece, is for the public to judge. The same goes for whether Turkey can obstruct a European project while seeking defense cooperation with the EU. If this is not the solution, someone needs to finally tell us what is.
Recently, I was reminded of another story: the S-300 missiles. In 1998, a meeting at the Maximos Mansion saw Prime Minister Costas Simitis prevent Glafcos Clerides from bringing the missiles to Cyprus. Clerides nonetheless took the decision upon himself.
He never spoke of what was discussed, nor did his associates. They never blamed Greece and bore the criticism from media and society in silence. Their priority was safeguarding relations with the national center and protecting national interest. What happened in that meeting only became clear twenty years later, through Giannakis Omirou, after Clerides had passed away.
Compare that behavior with that of Nikos Christodoulides, and the difference in leadership is striking. After Kyriakos Mitsotakis rightly assumed half the risk of the GSI project and became its direct interlocutor, the Cypriot President engaged in grandstanding with his infamous line: “The Cypriot government does not get blackmailed.”
He jeopardized the unity of Hellenism for a few rounds of self-serving applause. The statement followed a false report his own government had leaked to a pro-government newspaper.
By contrast, the Greek government acted seriously. The Prime Minister convened an emergency Sunday meeting. There were no leaks. The Greek Energy Minister delivered a clear statement with three points: Greece never blackmails; there is double-speak in Cyprus, as it is unthinkable for the Finance Minister not to recognize the President’s signature; and before discussing others’ obligations, the project licenses should first be transferred to ADMIE, something that had not been done for a year.
In a spectacular retreat, Cyprus quietly transferred the licenses that same week.
