Opinion
By Paschos Mandravelis
The most dangerous development in the war in the Persian Gulf, at least in the medium term, is Iran’s new defensive doctrine, which they call the “Mosaic of Decentralized Defense.” According to the country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, “we had two decades to study the defeats of the American army in the neighboring countries to the east and west of Iran (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan). We have incorporated these lessons into our strategy. The bombing of the capital will have no impact on our ability to wage war. Our ‘Mosaic of Decentralized Defense’ allows us to decide when and how this war will end” (X, 1.3.2026).
The truth is that in 2003 the regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed overnight when the “coalition of the willing” struck and destroyed the central command system of the Iraqi armed forces. That was the conventional, linear war we knew in the twentieth century. Iran appears to be following a different tactic, something that explains the erratic strikes on neighboring countries, even relatively friendly ones. According to Araghchi, “what happened in Oman was not our choice (…) but our military units are now independent and, in a way, isolated, operating under orders they had received in advance…” (Al Jazeera, 2.3.2026).
This strategy during wartime is diplomatically damaging for Iran, because the foreign minister then has to run around cleaning up the mess. But it becomes disastrous for the entire region the day after the war, because it guarantees chaos. Even if we assume that the U.S. government knows what it wants from this war and that Iran’s central command capitulates under the terms set by the American president, where could it go? At some point it will have to reach a settlement. Still, it is far from certain that these “independent and, in some way, isolated” military units will obey. In any case, these small armies are not commanded by the “best boys,” nor by people who understand the need for stability and prosperity in the region. They are fanatics who will become warlords, and they will most likely turn against any leadership that capitulates to the “devils” of the United States, especially at a moment when they are mourning their religious leader.
Moreover, when the chain of command breaks, many ambitions are born. Either “pure” ones or profitable ones. When we say “pure,” we do not necessarily mean good, but “pure” within the moral system that has been shaped over the past fifty years in Iran and whose core is hatred. Many will proclaim that they can confront the enemy better than the “sellouts of Tehran” or other warlords who are more conciliatory. Others will do so because they truly believe in “holy wars,” and others because “there is a lot of money in the region.” These differences will be settled only with weapons, and the question is what kind of warlord will control the region around the Strait of Hormuz so that we know what we will pay for this war.
We hope that the troupe currently running Washington has thought through all these parameters, although we fear that Trump started this war so that he could later declare that he had achieved the eighth (?) or ninth (?) peace settlement of his presidency. For Israel, where they have more sense, an Iran shattered by civil wars would be the best possible outcome, since after Iraq and Syria another major threat would be eliminated for a long time.
We do not know what will happen in the long term. It may be, perhaps by some miracle, that the breakup of Iran brings peace to the region. But then again, as Keynes used to say, “in the long run we are all dead.”
