Opinion
By Larkos Larkou
Events are unfolding quickly. Germany is stepping up its push for major institutional reforms within the European Union, with the primary goal of curbing the veto power of member states in critical foreign policy decisions. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul argued that "the principle of unanimity has repeatedly led the EU into deadlock, preventing Brussels from acting as one and responding swiftly on the international stage." According to Wadephul, "around a dozen member states support a qualified majority voting system, so that one or two countries cannot block common decisions." He pointed to Hungary as an example (News 12, 9/5/26). Euronews explains the issue clearly: "Under the EU's unanimity rule, a member state can halt decisions on foreign policy, sanctions, taxation, and enlargement. With 27 members at the negotiating table, the likelihood of deadlock is considerable, and in recent years it has become a political reality rather than a theoretical risk" (2/4/26).
There is also another angle to consider. The Turkish financial newspaper Dünya argues that adopting qualified majority voting could fundamentally shift the balance within the EU and reduce the Republic of Cyprus's ability to block decisions involving Ankara. The report cites Wadephul's statement that "a single country cannot hold Europe hostage." The newspaper directly links the proposed reform to the Cyprus problem and EU-Turkey relations, arguing that "for years Brussels used the Republic of Cyprus's veto as an institutional excuse for freezing Turkey's accession process, the customs union, and defense cooperation" ("Edo Tourkia," 26/4).
The political context within the European system matters. A veto is meant to express a realistic objection. It is a tool used to secure an attainable concession, a better arrangement, or an outcome that offers greater value than simply exercising the veto itself. In practice, it is connected to negotiation and mutually beneficial compromise. Once an acceptable agreement is reached, the objection is withdrawn as part of the EU's continuous evolution.
If every member state viewed the veto the way many people in Cyprus do, the European Union would simply not exist. The debate ultimately comes down to how each country sees the future of the EU, what perspective it brings to the table, and whether it places its own interests within the framework of the common European interest.
Cyprus needs to follow developments carefully, make full use of every diplomatic tool available within the European arena, and keep four facts in mind.
First, every member state enjoys the same rights.
Second, Cyprus became a member of the European Union because none of the parliaments of the then EU-15 chose to exercise a veto.
Third, while Cyprus was already inside the Union and Turkey remained outside, the then president discarded the country's strongest negotiating card when he voted on October 5, 2005, to launch EU-Turkey accession negotiations in exchange for nothing at all.
Fourth, Greek Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Costas Simitis used Greece's veto power to Cyprus's advantage on two important occasions. The first came on March 6, 1995, when Cyprus secured the opening of accession negotiations in exchange for the EU-Turkey Customs Union. The second came on December 11, 1999, when Cyprus's accession to the EU was agreed, with or without a settlement, alongside a timetable for the launch of EU-Turkey accession talks.
In both cases, the strategy that produced results was based on mutual benefit. It was a genuine win-win approach.
The notion of "punishment" and "reward" exists only in the Greek Cypriot imagination. It has little to do with the way the European Union operates. As a result, the scenario of applying pressure on Turkey while handing Cyprus a reward simply does not exist. It has not materialized during the 22 years of Cyprus's membership in the EU.
This misconception stems from the belief that Cyprus is an emerging superpower entitled to dictate terms to others.
For decades, the pattern has remained the same. Grand declarations, silence on major issues, and stubbornness over matters of limited importance. In Cyprus, champions of slogans are enamored with the veto because they envision an EU directed by the last carriage of the train, or an EU that stalls, delays, and becomes trapped by its own inability to act.
Nicosia could strengthen its position by entering this discussion with determination and putting forward proposals of its own. One option would be a decision-making system in which a proposal passes with the support of 20 out of 27 member states. Twenty is a realistic threshold. It guarantees that only proposals backed by a strong majority can succeed.
Otherwise, at some point, Germany's proposal is likely to prevail, and Cyprus will find itself looking back nostalgically at "our veto" after it is gone.
