Pavlos Xanthoulis
Not long ago, we wrote about the "red lights" Erdoğan had switched on over the Cyprus issue, effectively rigging the playing field and setting clear limits on any initiative the outgoing UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, might attempt. We contrasted those red lights with the "green lights" that Nicosia, for reasons that remain unclear, insists on seeing. The government appears convinced that the Turkish president has encouraged Guterres to launch another Cyprus initiative, one that reflects the Greek Cypriot side's positions. Erdoğan's latest statements, along with those from Turkey's Ministry of Defense and National Security Council, leave little room for confusion over Ankara's reference to "separate entities." The objective is to secure "sovereign equality" for the so-called "TRNC," in other words, the breakaway regime.
But who are the sponsors behind Erdoğan's confidence? Who has made him feel comfortable enough to dictate terms and conditions without regard for anyone or anything?
The primary sponsor is the European Union. Even though it recognizes that the Turkish president has dismantled the rule of law, crushed human rights in his own country, abandoned the agreed basis for resolving the Cyprus problem, and continued making arbitrary claims in the Aegean, the EU had no hesitation in sending three senior officials to Turkey bearing gifts: Kallas, Kos, and Brunner.
In doing so, the EU reached out to Erdoğan, whom the European Parliament itself describes as leading an "authoritarian" regime. The three European officials effectively sponsored that same "authoritarian regime" by offering the Connectivity Agenda, giving Turkey an opportunity to position itself as the bridge connecting Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The vision extends well beyond security, encompassing trade, energy, and digital corridors.
The sponsors also made sure to accommodate Erdoğan's priorities on security and defense, especially with the NATO summit approaching. They reminded everyone that Turkey has NATO's second-largest military and allowed expectations to circulate that the EU sees Turkey filling the gap in Europe's defense and security architecture following the United States' gradual pullback.
The EU's "Big Three," whose political weight recalls The Three Stooges with every respect to the famous comedy trio, focused almost exclusively on Turkey's strategic value. According to information obtained by Kathimerini, "Europe's Three Stooges" also allowed word to circulate that they favor Ankara's participation, as a state entity, in the EU's joint defense procurement programs, including SAFE.
That goes beyond Turkish defense companies, which have already found their way into the SAFE program through partnerships with European firms, with Nicosia's acceptance. As Kaja Kallas herself explained, "Turkey makes a significant contribution to protecting NATO's eastern flank," an area the EU increasingly relies upon for its own security.
Officially, the three EU officials also discussed the unresolved issues in EU-Turkey relations. At the same time, they made sure it became known that "this is not the time for demands, but for strengthening EU-Turkey relations," a position also reported by Politico.
By the EU's own admission, this is simply not the right moment to press Ankara with demands. That completely strips away the expectations Nicosia has carried for the past three years. Those expectations rest on the belief that Brussels and the EU member states would take the lead in efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, intervene decisively, and persuade Erdoğan to accept a bizonal, bicommunal federation by using the EU-Turkey relationship as leverage.
The revelation by Kathimerini's business edition that the EU has accepted false information from Erdoğan's government regarding the servicing of Russia's shadow fleet in 196 cases over just four months speaks for itself.
It reveals how determined the EU has become to grant Ankara a free pass, even when it comes to violating European sanctions against Russia. Those sanctions clearly receive far more serious attention than the largely rhetorical interest Brussels continues to express on the Cyprus issue.
But then again, what else can anyone expect from the sponsors?
