Yiannis Ioannou
New York is behind us. The UN General Assembly and its side meetings have shown us, to a large extent, how efforts to break the deadlock on the Cyprus issue will proceed—nearly eight years after the Crans Montana talks collapsed in 2017.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan was clear in his speech to the General Assembly, calling on the international community to recognize the so-called TRNC and advocating for a two-state solution in Cyprus, citing new realities on the ground and the need for recognition of sovereign equality. In his meeting with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Erdogan did not reject a trilateral meeting outright but made it contingent on these new conditions. Notably, his speech at the General Assembly came right after his meeting with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, signaling that while Athens and Ankara are making progress on bilateral issues, they have effectively sidelined the unresolved Cyprus problem, treating it as an issue that neither interferes with nor influences Greek-Turkish relations.
Furthermore, Turkey's stance seems largely unaffected by the conclusions of the European Council, the state of EU-Turkey relations, or whether Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is allowed to attend Gymnich meetings.
We find ourselves at a difficult crossroads. In the coming years—whether with or without Tatar in power—we will face two tough choices: a bad option and a worse one. On one hand, we could continue with the status quo, where nothing changes (trilateral talks, a conference on the Cyprus problem, followed by more stagnation). On the other hand, we could re-engage with the Cyprus issue, knowing that we are unlikely to achieve any significant gains against Turkey, which insists on a two-state solution but shows some flexibility in beginning a new process based on these "new realities," starting with a trilateral meeting.
In this context, the idea of the Greek Cypriot side entering talks merely to win the blame game by portraying Turkey as the side unwilling to reach a solution seems increasingly futile. Our insistence on resuming talks from where they left off in 2017 has done nothing to move Turkey from its entrenched position favoring a two-state solution. So, what can be done? We need to collectively and responsibly consider whether there is a way out of this deadlock, one that not only brings us back to the negotiating table but also reaffirms the agreed-upon framework that has been in place for years. Can we, in all honesty and seriousness, ever again consider a mutually acceptable solution? Or will we continue to hold our current position—"we want a solution," while "Turkey does not"—and watch as the status quo solidifies, regardless of who wins the blame game?
There is no fourth strategic option for breaking the deadlock in the Cyprus talks. The hard truths are clear. Before we start assigning blame, politicizing the issue, or overanalyzing Turkey's stance—often incorrectly—we must first acknowledge the reality of the situation. What we need now is honesty and seriousness.
[This article was translated from its Greek original]
