Yiannis Ioannou
There is no doubt that 2025 will be a pivotal year for the Cyprus problem as we have historically understood it. In the first quarter of the new year, we are expected to attend an international conference on Cyprus as part of the UN's efforts to break the deadlock in the talks—a stalemate that has persisted for eight years.
Nicosia's choices will be far from easy. Turkey appears to have shifted its approach, Tatar, as long as he remains in power, shows no signs of flexibility, and the ambitious goals set by the Christodoulides government—whether for the active involvement of the EU in the process or the linking of Cyprus and Euro-Turkish issues—have not yet yielded any spectacular results, despite being highly promoted. In fact, Nicosia’s options this time seem to range between unfavorable and marginally less unfavorable scenarios.
2025 appears to mark a transitional period, pointing toward a resolution—or lack thereof—of the Cyprus impasse. In the event of a failed international conference—even if our side manages to win the blame game—the Cyprus process will enter an extremely challenging phase. This would be a vacuum of both space and time, during which, even if immediate catastrophic outcomes like the recognition of the "TRNC" by a Kyrgyz-style state or the formal annexation of northern Cyprus by Turkey are avoided, the aftermath will not be an easy one.
This is because, for the first time, the framework for a Cyprus settlement as we have known it historically could be questioned, even at the highest levels of the UN Security Council. As we approach an unprecedented decade since the breakdown in 2017—and what could be the final culmination of the Cyprus problem—this process will lay bare existential challenges for our survival as a state.
What does this transition signal? Certainly, it signals a punctuated grid of realizations that should engage all sectors of society.
For the political elites and the Christodoulides government, this transition will entail managing—and potentially bearing the political cost of—a possible partition. The de facto division is now clear, and its potential formalization is looming. This is a scenario that Greek Cypriot politicians, unfortunately, often fail to grasp in its full gravity, beyond superficial interpretations.
However, this transitional period also contains the seeds of a new approach—not necessarily regarding the Cyprus problem itself, its plans, or the form of the solution, but rather concerning the harsh realities of the future. If we truly want to survive in this corner of the Eastern Mediterranean, we must address these realities head-on.
Could this be a wake-up call? Fifty years after 1974, could we finally begin to shape a substantive vision for the next fifty years of the Republic of Cyprus? Could we confront the possibility of an unresolved Cyprus problem and the absence of coexistence in a cooperative state? Perhaps.
Every transition brings with it a new social and political process. With the Cyprus problem unresolved, the only certainty is that we are heading into uncharted waters. The nature of this awakening, if it even occurs, remains to be seen.
2025 is critical because it is transitional. Let us hope it is also the year we "get our act together"—a year when we take meaningful steps to end the occupation and reunite our land in peace.
This opinion was translated from its Greek original.
