George Kakouris
The outcome of the informal dinner in New York, besides the attempt to intensify efforts to resolve the seven-year stalemate in the Cyprus issue, further underscored—especially with the statements from Christodoulides and Tatar after their return from the U.S.—the differing circumstances faced by the two leaders at a tactical level.
These circumstances relate to the leaders' ability, or lack thereof, to present their strategies as effective to both domestic audiences and international stakeholders. Although no negotiations have occurred, nor is there an immediate prospect for their resumption, certain "preliminary" steps have been taken. Whether these will lay the groundwork for the future remains to be seen, as they require significant consultation in their own right.
Mr. Christodoulides seemed more at ease communicating the outcomes of the discussions.
The "preliminaries" refer to procedural matters and the agenda for efforts along two "tracks" suggested by the UN Secretary-General: the proposal for expanded informal meetings with guarantor powers (which would involve governance, troops, and guarantees) and the leaders' meetings in Nicosia aimed at promoting confidence-building measures (currently focusing only on crossing points).
In both areas, the leaders' strategies are influenced by the degree of comfort they feel, or lack thereof, based on internal political dynamics within their communities and how one leader's approach affects the other.
Regarding the expanded informal meetings, Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar has pushed for a composition that differs from the previous five-party format (two sides and three guarantors). He prefers a setup with two communities and two "guardians," Greece and Turkey. In his initial remarks after the dinner, Tatar focused on the participation of Greece and Turkey but acknowledged that the UN Secretary-General would also involve the UK. Since the UK believes it should be included—a position supported by Greece—the discussions are converging in that direction.
Mr. Christodoulides, for his part, was more comfortable relaying the developments, precisely for this reason. However, what the Greek Cypriot side downplays in communications is that the realization of these expanded informal contacts is not guaranteed and may not happen quickly, especially before the 2025 Turkish Cypriot leadership elections.
As for the discussion on reopening crossing points, the Greek Cypriot side was in a position to informally leak that, while Mr. Christodoulides made proposals for additional confidence-building measures, Mr. Tatar spent much of the discussion focusing on issues arising from legal actions against businesses illegally using Greek Cypriot properties.
The Greek Cypriot side has taken advantage of this to portray itself as the responsible party, offering concrete proposals and initiatives. This image is easy to foster, given Mr. Tatar's frequent missteps, which Ankara also seems to disapprove of, as it seeks room for rhetorical and pre-negotiation flexibility.
This is why Mr. Tatar, under criticism from the Turkish Cypriot opposition, continues to emphasize his stance on sovereign equality, repeatedly stating, "I told them." However, this repetition without concrete proposals has led to little more than what the Turkish Cypriot side has already gained—the UN's willingness to find a way to ensure that any future process remains within the framework of a solution, while also addressing legitimate Turkish Cypriot concerns about their future if talks were to collapse.
The Greek Cypriot side is in a much easier position. Mustafa Akinci's statements—beyond the trivial comments that made headlines in the Greek Cypriot media—and his unilateral proposals, such as a territorial map without prior consultation with Turkey, have created a sense of urgency. Mr. Christodoulides can easily use the rhetorical device of "I am not here to blame" by referencing UN Secretary-General proposals rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side and informally sharing further details with the press.
This tactic is legitimate, not because the Greek Cypriot side is competing with the Turkish Cypriot side, but because, over time, politicians on both sides who seek a resolution to the Cyprus issue have a reasonable interest in promoting the image that serious proposals, not rejections, are what will change the course of negotiations and improve the daily lives of Cypriots.
The Greek Cypriot approach should be assertive, especially now that it doesn't need to be (for instance, by unilaterally opening the crossing point at the Ledra Street crossing, which was proposed by Mrs. Olgun). It should not only point to instances where it has said "yes" against the Turkish side's "no" (such as the appointment of an envoy) or highlight procedural and limited measures for Turkish Cypriot citizens.
When one side consistently fumbles, it becomes harder to assess the competence of the side that manages its communications and diplomacy more skillfully.
