George Kakouris
We say Cyprus is an indivisible, unified, consubstantial state that could become a federation. Others argue for two independent, sovereign, heteronomous states forming a federation. These are the two prevailing doctrines on the nature of the Cyprus problem. Beneath the words and the actions of the past decades lie the fundamental factors that have kept possibilities locked and engaged the nation’s human resources.
Everything else—the state’s flexibility, the distribution of powers, their sources and dispersal—are merely tools used to reconcile these doctrines, allowing the political elites on both sides, as well as Turkish and Greek foreign policy, to eventually claim victory.
For decades, the Cyprus problem has revolved around the same constructive ambiguities—ambiguities that exist not only between the communities but also within them.
For Greek Cypriots, a federation promises state unity, alongside freedom of movement and residence (which is essentially what the terms "liberation" and "ending the occupation" mean in practice). At the same time, it acknowledges the reality of two distinct societies that will continue to maintain separate state structures—something the average Greek Cypriot, particularly those from the generations of the 1960s civil war and the 1974 invasion, desires but rarely admits.
From my limited perspective as a Greek Cypriot, I understand that for Turkish Cypriots, a federation ensures the autonomy they seek after the events leading up to the 1970s, while also allowing them to participate in a somewhat orderly state within the EU, separate yet connected to Turkey. Turkey, in their view, is likely seen as both an occupying force and a sister nation—familiar, but better kept distinct.
If Ersin Tatar is eventually pressured to soften his stance (as Dervis Eroglu was), the Turkish side might be compelled to discuss and present the "two-state solution" more flexibly, to avoid being cornered. Contrary to the Greek Cypriot leadership’s portrayal, the Turkish side is not omnipotent nor Machiavellian. It may have more strategic foresight, but it is also driven by micropolitics, circumstances, and needs.
The "two-state solution" discussed by the other side doesn’t necessarily mean a fully independent "TRNC" as the 194th UN member state or the 28th EU member state. Other possibilities arise from statements made and the real obstacles to full independence—such as the evolution of a Turkish Cypriot state with the occupied territories recognized by some but not all, and Northern Cyprus becoming a military base for Turkey and a hub for corruption within the Turkish state apparatus.
Confederation, with some degree of sovereignty, could also be framed as a "two-state solution," similar to a loose federation of two states within the EU. Or it could be portrayed as a confederation of two states within the EU, despite the EU only recognizing one state.
These interpretations reflect the nuances in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions, as well as the gray areas within and between them. Our interpretations should be based on logic and data, not on wishful thinking. However, we must also be flexible in our interpretations to avoid complacency and being caught unprepared by Turkish intransigence.
If there’s even the slightest chance to return to discussions about some form of federation, we must seize it and approach it sensibly. While every "plan" seems worse, this is not an absolute truth. When we work seriously and intensively, as we did under Christofias-Talat and Anastasiades-Akinci, improvements can be made.
The most crucial improvement now would be to ensure that the process is conducted with full, continuous, clear, and proactive communication with citizens, involving them in providing feedback. The Greek Cypriot leadership should consider ideas, suggestions, and objections on the substance, rather than merely relying on polls about the government's popularity. We also need to establish mechanisms that allow for evolutionary momentum, enabling citizens to promote their preference for either a looser or a stronger central state through their vote.
[This article was translated from its Greek original]
