Billions in gas, years of waiting, Americans back on

2026 is shaping up as a pivotal year for the Republic of Cyprus’ energy program, with developments related both to hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and to the broader energy picture in the Eastern Mediterranean beginning to take concrete shape as planning moves forward. At the same time, the fluidity of geopolitical realignments in the region suggests that developments are also taking on a distinct “geopolitical dimension,” marked by a dynamic return of the United States to the regional subsystem, a development that will reveal whether the Republic of Cyprus will actively align itself or remain on the sidelines.

None of these developments, however, guarantee an immediate flow of natural gas, let alone exports, from Cyprus. Realistically, the arrival of “Cypriot gas” remains, broadly speaking, a post-2030 prospect.

Kronos first

The “Kronos” gas field in Block 6 of Cyprus’ EEZ is expected, barring unforeseen developments, to become the country’s first natural gas field to enter production. The 2.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) managed by the Italian-French Total–ENI consortium is at an advanced stage following negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus, the consortium partners and Egypt.

What is now expected is the announcement of the Final Investment Decision (FID) for the field’s development this April, on the sidelines of the Egypt Energy Show in Cairo. Kronos has effectively been linked to Egypt’s infrastructure through agreements governing the routing of natural gas production in the region, particularly Israeli gas from the Leviathan field (22.4 tcf) to Egypt’s LNG terminals at Idku and Damietta, as well as through the bilateral Cyprus–Egypt agreement.

It is worth noting that decisions regarding Kronos are aligned with the broader strategy for exporting Leviathan gas to Egypt. In the region, another key player, U.S.-based Chevron, recently delivered the completed FID for Leviathan, effectively activating the $35 billion Israel–Egypt strategic agreement.

Aphrodite moves forward

In March, Cyprus and Israel are also expected to resolve a long-standing issue that has delayed the development of the Aphrodite field for more than a decade. Aphrodite, Cyprus’ first natural gas discovery in 2011, lies in Block 12 of the Cypriot EEZ.

The dispute with the adjacent Ishai field in Israel’s EEZ appears to be nearing final resolution, focusing on the terms of joint development. Even so, this does not mean that Aphrodite will enter production immediately once the issue is settled. Still, operator Chevron is expected to proceed within the year with the field’s preliminary development and, as required, submit the Final Investment Decision by year’s end.

It is recalled that Aphrodite’s estimated 3.9 tcf could be integrated into the region’s planning to meet both Cyprus’ domestic needs and exports via the so-called “Egyptian corridor.”

Glaucus and Pegasus

The Glaucus and Pegasus fields in Block 10 of Cyprus’ EEZ also appear to be moving into sequence. The estimated 6–9 tcf of natural gas in what is considered the most promising block of Cyprus’ EEZ is expected to be declared commercially viable by operator ExxonMobil, also in April.

This decision would mark a milestone, as the declaration of commercial viability is a prerequisite for the development of any hydrocarbon field. Naturally, such a move by the U.S. energy giant would not signal immediate development; Aphrodite, for example, was declared commercially viable in 2014, placing any development timeline firmly in the next decade.

What adds particular interest, however, is information suggesting that ExxonMobil could proceed with selling its rights in Block 10, potentially reshaping the map of Cyprus’ EEZ. If confirmed, and depending on the incoming player, such a move could accelerate the development of what is considered the largest gas prospect in Cyprus’ EEZ.

The return of the Americans

While the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean remains fluid, it is nonetheless taking on a clearer form. It points to a dynamic return of U.S. companies, most notably Chevron, seeking to combine commercial benefits with specific “geopolitical frameworks” centered on cooperation and stability in the region.

In recent weeks, it has become apparent that the United States:

• Applied pressure on the Netanyahu government to move forward with Israeli gas exports to Egypt, a deal anchored in the stability and security architecture of the MENA region, routed through Cairo, and built on the Egypt–Israel partnership, which has been tested over the past year, including by the war in Gaza.
• Is entering Syria dynamically, with the Damascus–Chevron agreement on hydrocarbon exploration off Syria’s coast also representing a U.S. vote of confidence in the new al-Sharaa government.

This latest development is one that Nicosia must factor into its strategic planning and interpretation of regional developments. The possibility of a Syria–Turkey maritime delimitation agreement, modeled on the 2019 Turkey–Libya memorandum, had circulated as a scenario months ago and had been examined by Cyprus.

Chevron’s entry into Syria, however, appears to indirectly confirm that Damascus’ current priority is the continued pursuit of international legitimacy rather than decision-making under Turkish pressure, an outcome that, in any case, constitutes positive news for Nicosia.