Alexis Papachelas
When we entered journalism, the older generation offered one piece of advice: "Never put the Cyprus issue first because it doesn't sell." Veteran colleagues joked that "we will retire before the Cyprus problem is solved."
But something unusual is happening. This issue may not "sell," but it can cause political turmoil in Athens. We've seen this from the era of Konstantinos Karamanlis and the Zurich–London agreements to Andreas Papandreou. Notably, the only time Papandreou was forced to apologize with his infamous mea culpa was when he was accused of sidelining the Cyprus issue during his meeting with Turgut Ozal in Davos.
The truth is that Hellenism paid a high price for neo-Byzantinism and the discord between Athens and Nicosia. There was a lack of sincerity between what Archbishop Makarios wanted and what the Greek governments wanted in the 1960s. Many impression-making games were played, and many attempts were made to pull one side or the other. A key example of this dysfunction was the Acheson Plan, which could have resolved the Cyprus problem under terms highly favorable to Greek interests.
What's done is done, one might say, and rightly so. But it is important to learn and study the history of this significant national issue without sentimentality or fiction.
Today, the danger lies in solidifying the partition imposed by the Turkish invasion of 1974. The international community is preoccupied with numerous pressing issues and does not address Cyprus. Cynical realists claim that "the problem was solved in 1974." Many Cypriots are weary and indifferent to the issue. A generation and a half has grown up without ever living with Turkish Cypriots and is reluctant to risk an uncertain cohabitation. The realistic solution of a "Velvet Divorce" no longer offers tangible benefits to the Greek Cypriot side, as Turkey is unwilling to return significant amounts of territory.
Thus, the window for reaching a solution that could pass a Greek Cypriot referendum is narrowing. The time for hard and final decisions has probably arrived. Let us hope that Athens and Nicosia will maintain a united front. All signs indicate that this is the intention of Christodoulides and Mitsotakis. Both have read enough history to understand how self-destructive intra-Greek blame games can be.
[This article was translated from its Greek original]
