The Republic of Cyprus is being held hostage by its own energy crisis, KNEWS

The entire national leadership over 25 years, including Ministers, officials, the Energy Regulatory Authority, DEFA, and ETYFA, is accountable for Cyprus's energy poverty. Photo credit: isimarkets.com

Apostolos Tomaras

26 JULY 2026 - 11:04

Energy Minister Michalis Damianos recently advised citizens to remain patient while the Transmission System Operator Cyprus (TSOC) rolls out scheduled blackouts during heatwaves over 40 degrees Celsius. Unsurprisingly, these comments met with anger and outrage. The power cuts last Thursday will certainly not be the last this summer, especially since last-minute fixes will fail just as they did with last year's water crisis. Regardless of official claims from the government and relevant departments, Cyprus faces serious energy insecurity. This problem goes beyond daily inconvenience and poses a real threat to national security. In past crises like the Mari disaster, power shortages could be explained as collateral damage, but that logic fails when a state experiences daytime solar power surpluses only to run out of electricity after 6 p.m. Equally frustrating is the stance of EAC Board Chairman Giorgos Petrou, who claims that things are on track and that current initiatives will yield results in two to three years. Both Mr. Petrou and Energy Minister Michalis Damianos offered wishes and advice to the public while avoiding one critical question: why were measures not taken to fix the immediate crisis instead of kicking the solution three years down the road? Current officials, the Energy Minister, his department, and the state-owned energy provider responsible for powering Cyprus bear direct blame for what citizens went through last Thursday and what they may endure for the rest of the summer. At the same time, the entire political establishment from 2005 onward carries massive, almost criminal responsibility.

Hostages to Irresponsibility

Without exaggeration, Cyprus's power supply situation is tragic. What proves most alarming is the failure of officials to answer a simple question from the public: was last Thursday's blackout the absolute limit for an energy-vulnerable state? Neither the Energy Minister nor his staff explained why they failed to prepare, even though they knew the national power grid could not handle the demand. They offered no reason why the rollout of storage systems moved so slowly, especially when current assurances claim these systems will finally be fully installed by 2027. Regarding renewable energy storage, current and past officials from 2017 onward owe the public an explanation. The massive surge in solar panel installations during that period made it clear that producing excess solar energy without a plan to store it would leave Cyprus exposed the moment the sun went down. One former high-ranking government official privately admitted that the state handed out solar park permits without requiring battery storage systems, fully aware that Cyprus would remain reliant on EAC's conventional power generation at night. That exact scenario played out last summer and is happening again this year.

The batteries

The need for solar storage systems to balance the energy supply was recognized nearly a decade ago. That was when technology emerged to capture daytime solar surpluses for evening use while protecting grid stability. International literature has acknowledged the necessity of energy storage since the mid-1950s. However, the renewable energy boom of the last decade, driven by plummeting solar panel costs, transformed the battery industry and accelerated chemical storage development. This technology uses rare-earth systems inside shipping containers that easily connect to the power grid. How did Cyprus respond? An industry official involved in renewables, speaking anonymously, put it simply: "We jumped into renewable technology completely unprepared. We overloaded the grid with power it couldn't handle."

Lost time

Facts and retroactive admissions from officials show that Cyprus wasted the years between 2018 and 2019. Instead of planning ahead, authorities are now scrambling at the last minute to buy and install batteries that can maintain a reliable energy surplus when the sun isn't shining. Only recently, on July 26, 2026, did TSOC and CYTA sign an agreement to procure and install the first storage units with a combined capacity of 120 MW. Before committing to chemical storage, leaders at the Energy Ministry and department heads lost critical time exploring alternative methods like hydroelectric storage.

The RED III directive exposes the government

The European Union's updated energy security directive, RED III, explicitly requires member states to promote decentralized energy production and storage, stating that European citizens should generate and manage their own renewable energy. This publication knows of valid proposals and studies from private foreign organizations and academics who advised the current government to support residential storage. Experts argued that home batteries would instantly turn the grid into a smart network, solving stability issues during peak daytime production and during the evening rush between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. Regulations for home battery installations have been stalled for months due to safety objections from the Fire Service. Market experts view these fire safety concerns regarding mature battery tech as baseless, noting that the Fire Service objects to a 5 kWh home battery while an electric vehicle with an 80 kWh battery parks in the exact same garage without issue.

Missed opportunities

Cyprus's energy deficit stems from a twenty-year failure between 2005 and 2025 to supply the domestic market with natural gas. While the details vary, the outcome remains the same: Cyprus remains vulnerable. Efforts to secure natural gas began in 2005, but every initiative ended in failure. In 2011, under the Christofias administration, the most promising plan to import natural gas and build a terminal at Vasilikos fell apart. Just before final contracts were signed between EAC, KOGAS, DEFA, and SHELL, sudden political pushback derailed the process in early 2011. Three years later, the Anastasiades government abandoned plans to supply the domestic market with native Cypriot gas, which had caused the 2011 setback, and began a long quest to import gas instead. Through 2019, every proposed interim solution collapsed. The final blow came in December 2019 with the contract award to CPP-METRON Consortium Ltd (CMC) for the Vasilikos terminal. That contract was ultimately terminated, leaving the project unfinished with no clear completion date.

Chrysochos and the EAC

If battery storage installation had moved on schedule and natural gas imports had been finalized, power outages would have been avoided entirely. Storage would have added 120 MW to the power supply, while natural gas would have allowed the EAC to run Unit 6 at Vasilikos, adding another 160 MW for a combined total of 280 MW. Another missing piece in preventing these blackouts is a private 260 MW conventional power plant built by Power Energy Cyprus (PEC), part of the Cyfield group. That plant remains idle because regulatory agencies claim it lacks several required permits, with the government citing legal violations that block an operating license. Group representative Giorgos Chrysochos contends that his investment fell victim to EAC union interests, maintaining that the plant could supply power immediately if connected to the distribution grid. Regardless of disputed permit violations, the government and state officials never considered using this plant to bridge the current energy gap. At the same time, authorities apply zoning and permit laws inconsistently. Energy market observers point out that the government showed no such strictness with hotel developments in Latchi, where an Israeli developer completed construction without securing the necessary permits. Following the blackouts, critics argue the government could have made special arrangements to resolve the issue and address the emergency.

Long-standing political and administrative responsibilities

While the current administration bears direct responsibility for this summer's power cuts, the political establishment over the last 25 years shares the blame for Cyprus's ongoing energy deficit, creating a long-running national scandal. The Anastasiades administration carries severe responsibility, particularly Giorgos Lakkotrypis, who served as Energy Minister for seven years and oversaw failed interim gas projects during a critical period of industry transformation. Current official Giorgos Papanastasiou also shares responsibility despite his attempts to prevent the collapse of the Vasilikos terminal contract. Massive blame falls on the Director Generals across the Ministry of Energy, the Energy Service, the Energy Regulatory Authority, DEFA, and ETYFA for their handling of the Vasilikos project. A rare exception is Eleni Vasileiadou, who took charge of DEFA in 2013 and resigned three years later over financial disagreements with then Energy Minister Giorgos Lakkotrypis. For the 2011 project failure, responsibility sits with Averof Neofytou and Solon Kasinis, whose opposition helped sink the most viable energy initiative the country ever had.

Key political figures during the relevant periods

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