Yiannis Ioannou
In Cyprus, historically, unlike many other countries, there has never been a conviction for corruption involving a sitting or former President of the Republic. The announcement by the Independent Authority Against Corruption regarding investigative journalist Makarios Drousiotis’ book “Mafia State”, published last week, named individuals and opened a major public debate about the limits of political, institutional and criminal responsibility for political figures in Cyprus.
For the sake of a meaningful discussion, it should be understood that the Independent Authority Against Corruption does not have the powers of a prosecutor or a court. It does not issue rulings or convictions. What it does, however, is set a highly significant precedent: an independent state body examined evidence and allegations contained in a book written by a former associate of then-President Nicos Anastasiades and reached findings that move the discussion from the realm of rumour, political sparring, online disputes or personal confrontation into the sphere of potential criminal investigation. This is particularly important when one considers Cyprus’ institutional timeline—a relatively young state of just 66 years—its constitutional peculiarities stemming from the post-1963 doctrine of necessity, the de facto situation following the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation, and the broader structure of how justice is administered in the Republic.
The bigger picture
When Makarios Drousiotis wrote and published “Mafia State” between 2020 and 2021, Mr. Anastasiades was still President of the Republic. The claims in the book, which later prompted a written response from the former President in his own publication “The Slanderer”, triggered a heated public debate with strong reactions on all sides. That debate carried over into the 2021 parliamentary elections and the 2023 presidential elections. It resurfaced again last week through exchanges between parties including DISY, AKEL, Volt and Almatos, as well as extensive online discussions.
What becomes clear in the Cypriot public sphere—both then and now—is the persistent confusion among citizens and political actors regarding the distinction between political and criminal responsibility. Criminal responsibility, when proven beyond doubt, leads to prosecution and potentially imprisonment. Political responsibility, even when not formally assumed, is tied to broader democratic principles such as accountability, avoidance of conflicts of interest, institutional balance, and the relationship of trust between the state and citizens. That trust inevitably depends on public confidence in institutions—something that strengthens democracy when present and weakens it when absent.
How institutions are tested
The findings of the Independent Authority Against Corruption require an institutional response, whether through the Attorney General’s Office or another legal mechanism that will determine whether a criminal case can be filed. This represents both the most important precedent and one of the greatest institutional challenges faced by the Republic of Cyprus in recent years.
As with the Polyviou report during the Christofias presidency (which was not issued by an independent authority), the “Mafia State” findings highlight the need for institutional reform. They also underline the importance of strengthening public trust in the justice system—not only in how justice is delivered, but in how visibly and transparently it is seen to be delivered. At the same time, they reinforce the European dimension of institutional credibility, particularly at a time when Cyprus holds the EU Presidency, a role often invoked in relation to the Cyprus problem as well.
In this context, questions about the structure of the Legal Service and the separation of powers are once again brought to the fore, alongside broader discussions about constitutional reform and institutional modernisation.
The Authority’s report requires an institutional response, whether through the Public Prosecutor or through another formal legal assessment by the competent Legal Service.
The political dimension
It is already clear that the “Mafia State” report will have significant political consequences in the period ahead, potentially accelerating political, institutional and possibly legal developments. Just as importantly, it is set to become a key reference point in the political agenda—especially in light of the recent parliamentary elections, the new composition of the House of Representatives, and the long pre-election cycle already underway ahead of the 2028 presidential elections.
The key question now is whether the report will serve as a positive precedent for institutional reform and accountability, or whether it will become a convenient political tool—used not to promote justice and responsibility, but to relativise past failures, omissions, or even allegations of corruption.
