Yiannis Ioannou
When Amos Hochstein, President Biden’s go-to envoy for tough Middle East negotiations, struck the Israel–Lebanon maritime deal in late 2022, in Nicosia of all places, a window suddenly opened. For Cyprus, it was a golden chance to finally settle its own maritime boundary with Lebanon, an issue stuck in limbo since 2007. That earlier agreement gathered dust for 18 years in the Lebanese parliament, blocked by political turmoil, Turkish pressure, and Lebanon’s unwillingness to fight “on two fronts” while its dispute with Israel remained unresolved.
Since then, everything in the region has changed. Hochstein has moved on, the Middle East is unrecognizable after October 7, Hezbollah’s influence is severely weakened, yet one thing has stayed exactly the same: U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. A simple look at the companies licensed in Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone shows the direction; beyond European giants Total and ENI, the unmistakable footprint of Qatar’s LNG sector stands out. That fits neatly into Washington’s broader goal: using energy cooperation not just for profit, but to bring regional players closer together.
What’s new this time
The maritime border agreement signed by President Nikos Christodoulides and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun doesn’t need approval from the Lebanese parliament, a major difference from the 2007 deal. Technically and legally, it follows the same model as before, sticking to international law and UNCLOS principles: the median-line method for drawing boundaries at sea.
That carries serious weight:
It challenges Turkey’s long-standing attempts to redraw maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean, from its disputes with Greece to the controversial 2019 “Turkish–Libyan Memorandum.”
It sets a powerful legal precedent for future deals in the region, including a potential Syria–Cyprus or Syria–Lebanon demarcation, at a time when Turkey is tightening its influence in Damascus.
The deal also deepens Cyprus–Lebanon cooperation across energy, maritime activity, and underwater infrastructure, areas that will only grow more important as the region shifts. Nicosia has been moving in this direction for months, offering support to Lebanon on security, migration, and EU relations. The recent Christodoulides–von der Leyen visit to Beirut, with a substantial economic package attached, signaled that momentum clearly.
Timing also worked in Cyprus’s favor. Hezbollah is at its weakest point in years, and President Aoun is no longer looking to Ankara as a reliable partner.
It’s a diplomatic win for Christodoulides, though the article is careful to note that this doesn’t magically turn Cyprus into the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy hub overnight. The regional puzzle remains huge and complicated. Still, the deal gives Cyprus something very valuable: a clean, legally bulletproof precedent for future negotiations.
Turkey’s reaction
Turkey’s first response, a Foreign Ministry statement complaining that the agreement concerns an area “outside the Turkish continental shelf,” reveals clear irritation but is seen by experts as more of a distraction than a genuine objection.
Christodoulides, meanwhile, didn’t miss the chance to send a subtle message to Ankara when asked about maritime demarcation, adding a political tone to the moment.
Turkey quickly tried to pull the Cyprus issue into the conversation, arguing that Turkish Cypriots weren’t consulted and reviving the familiar narrative of “sovereign equality.” Reports in the Turkish press hinting at military responses or aggressive moves in Cyprus’s EEZ are viewed as exaggerated, more “Blue Homeland” bravado than real intent.
That said, Turkey’s record speaks for itself: between 2018 and 2020, long before any Cyprus–Lebanon deal was on the table, Ankara conducted illegal drilling in Cyprus’s licensed blocks and even blocked operations in Block 3.
What remains to be seen is whether Ankara will try once again to drag natural gas into future Cyprus talks, pushing for joint decision-making or revenue-sharing, demands made even by the most moderate Turkish Cypriot leaders in the past.
*Read the Greek version here.
