Yiannis Ioannou
The period following the informal five-party summit in Geneva and the subsequent meeting of the two Cypriot leaders on the island is shaping up to be a diplomatically crucial time. With a second round of Geneva talks, or “Geneva II,” tentatively scheduled for the end of July, the United Nations is ramping up pressure on both sides to deliver tangible outcomes, especially on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the long-stalled issue of opening new crossing points.
But the buffer zone continues to be a thorny subject, complicating progress on crossings. That much became clear during discussions around a proposed renewable energy park in the buffer zone, an idea put forward in the context of CBMs during the leaders’ last meeting after Geneva.
Ground realities: The buffer zone as battleground
Nearly eight years after talks collapsed in 2017, the buffer zone has not only remained a source of friction, it's become a space where tensions flare and rival narratives clash. Reports from the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in recent years have noted the rising stakes in this area. The most alarming incident was the 2023 crisis in Pyla, where UN peacekeepers were attacked by Turkish Cypriot personnel over a road project linking Arsos and Pyla, a move seen as a violation by the occupying authorities.
Three key patterns have emerged in this new reality:
- The buffer zone is being used as a tool by both communities to advance their own claims or retaliate against the other, whether the issue is military presence, housing developments, public works, or farming near the zone. It's a tit-for-tat dynamic with each side mirroring the other's moves.
- A creeping militarization of the zone is underway on the Turkish Cypriot side. There’s been increased installation of surveillance cameras, new outposts in areas like Ayios Dometios, and reports of harassment of farmers by Turkish troops.
- An insistence by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, under Ersin Tatar, on framing any development within the buffer zone, including CBMs and crossing point discussions, as a sovereignty issue. This approach is designed to reinforce the narrative of two separate states.
The Pyla incident and the eventual agreement that followed created new bargaining dynamics, particularly in talks about opening more crossing points.
Where things stand
Ongoing discussions over new crossings, led by negotiators Menelaos Menelaou and Güneş Onar, have taken on a symbolic weight. Among seasoned Cyprus watchers, there’s a growing concern: “If the two sides can’t even agree on opening a crossing, how can they ever sit down for meaningful negotiations?”
On the ground, there’s been limited progress. The Greek Cypriot side has tabled a comprehensive proposal, including maps and suggested transit points, while the Turkish Cypriot side remains focused on pushing for the Luroujina crossing. Their position consistently ties the issue to “sovereign equality” and insists on equating areas within the buffer zone with territory claimed by the so-called “TRNC.” This line of argument harks back to events from 1974 to 1977, when the ceasefire line was still being shaped in real time.
Still, the two negotiators met again last week, and according to sources, they are actively preparing for another leaders' meeting. They’re revisiting all topics agreed upon in Geneva. Notably, at their April 2 meeting, President Christodoulides and Mr. Tatar agreed to establish a Technical Committee on Youth, resume discussions on demining efforts, pursue environmental and climate initiatives, and work on restoring cemeteries.
The return of María Ángela Holguín
Another key factor is the role of the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy on Cyprus, María Ángela Holguín. Reports suggest she’s expected back on the island soon, potentially taking a more hands-on approach than before.
Her return carries two implications:
1. Whether she will base herself in Cyprus to facilitate regular meetings between the leaders and engage the three guarantor powers more effectively.
2. Whether her presence can help bridge gaps and lead to concrete agreements, particularly on CBMs and the politically charged issue of crossings, ahead of the second Geneva round.
But time is not on her side. Holguín has a narrow two-month window before the ''elections'' in the occupied areas, and once 2026 begins, Cyprus will be preparing to hold the rotating EU presidency, a time when EU member states traditionally avoid pursuing national diplomatic initiatives.
Holguín’s recent report shed light on the tensions in the buffer zone and reportedly helped shape a scaled-down CBM framework, including discussion of new crossings. Whether her second stint will break the deadlock or simply confirm the depth of disagreement, even over something as basic as a few crossings, remains to be seen.
